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ABSTRACT 
 
An Empirical Analysis of Chinese Housing Markets 
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In previous decades, Chinese real estate markets have matured with the implementation of housing 
commercialization and deepening reform in the land transferring system. Housing prices in China 
have risen steeply in recent years. This paper proposes some crucial problems about Chinese real 
estate markets. Two chapters make analysis from the credit point of view. One focuses on the 
importance of real estate investment to the economy in China under credit constraint. Another 
chapter focuses on the heterogeneous effect of credit on housing prices between two different 
regions. Then, according to land transform regulation in China, chapter 4 emphatically analyzes 
the relationship of public finance and retail housing prices after the financial crisis in 2008. 
This thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 makes a brief introduction of Chinese housing 
markets. The real estate industry is a capital-intensive industry. With the development of the 
Chinese housing market, credit becomes an indispensable link in real estate reproduction and 
transaction. Because of this, this chapter discusses real estate credit and its influencing factors. 
Based on the introduction of real estate credit, the chapter describes the relationship between 
housing price and credit. Given the close relationship between real estate development and 
economic growth, this chapter also shows the current situation of real estate investment in China. 
In the end, from the perspective of government regulation, chapter 1 emphasizes the land policies 
and government spending in China. 
Chapter 2 investigates the relationship between real estate investment and national economic 
growth under different credit constraints. Many researchers believed that real estate investment 
has a unique influence on economic growth. Real estate is not only a large-scale industry with a 
multiplier effect, but also a department which can drive many external industries. Apparently, real 
estate investment requires enormous amount of money and real estate developers can hardly take 
charge through their own efforts. Hence, the real estate industry cannot operate without the 
support of credit funds. This chapter uses the threshold model, based on annual data from 31 
provinces from 2006 to 2012 to find out different effect of real estate investment on local 
economic growth. From the perspective of credit constraints, the influence of real estate 
investment on economic growth exists as a single threshold effect. In the loose range of credit 
constraint, the effect of real estate investment on economic growth is apparently greater than that 
in the tight range of credit constraint. If the credit constraint is tightened, the promotion of 
economic growth will be limited through the channel of real estate investment. 
Housing prices are affected by regional economic fundamentals. In this case, exploring the 
impact of primary determined economic factors on regional real estate markets becomes an 
interesting topic. As we all know, coastal provinces in China have a solid economic condition and 
are famous for their export-oriented economy. Compared to the coastal provinces, the inland 
region tends to be economically inward-looking. The real estate market in coastal regions shows 
different characteristics compared with other regions. Chapter 3 selects 22 provinces and divides 
them into coastal provinces and inland provinces. Bank credit funds which support real estate 
include two types: real estate development loans and personal housing mortgage loans. By means 
of the panel vector auto regression (PVAR) model, this chapter investigates the dynamic 
relationships among housing price and credit in these two different regions. Our findings explore 
provincial panel data instead of national data to give specific comparisons between the two 
regions, and we then provide policy recommendations based on different economic development 
levels. The outcome emphasizes that housing loans has a strong effect on housing prices in inland 
provinces. In order to stabilize the real estate market development, different regulations should be 
implemented by local governments according to their own economic situation. 
 China’s economy has been severely affected since the finance crisis in 2008. The central 
government promulgated the monetary policy to stimulate the economic recovery. One of the most 
remarkable measures was that the government planned to invest four trillion Yuan into the market, 
trying to stimulate short-term domestic demand. It is noteworthy that the central government only 
provided 1.8 trillion Yuan and the remainder was raised by local governments. Therefore, to 
finance the public finance, the local governments in china have to gain more income. Based on the 
special land policies in China, it is interesting to examine whether a causal relationship exists 
among house price, land purchase fee, and local government spending after the financial crisis of 
2008. Chapter 4 applies both normal granger causality approach and bootstrap panel granger 
causality test to find out whether there exists a causal relationship among housing price, land 
purchase fee and government spending in coastal provinces in China. The bootstrap panel granger 
causality test results suggest that there is one-way granger causality from GHP (growth rate of 
housing price) to GLP (growth rate of land purchase fee) in Beijing and Jiangsu. As regard to the 
direction of GLP (growth rate of land purchase fee) to GHP (growth rate of housing price) in 
coastal provinces, a significant relationship exists in Guangdong. Beijing rejects the hypothesis 
that GHP (growth rate of housing price) does not cause GGS (growth rate of government spending) 
at 5% level of significance. We find one-way granger causality running from GGS (growth rate of 
government spending) to GLP (growth rate of land purchase fee) in Shandong only. There is no 
empirical evidence of granger causality from GGS (growth rate of government spending) to GHP 
(growth rate of housing price) and from GLP (growth rate of land purchase fee) to GGS (growth 
rate of government spending) in any coastal province or city, which indicates that the measure of 
putting four trillion Yuan into the market by government to enlarge domestic demand when a 
financial crisis happens has no effect on the housing market, at least in coastal areas. The granger 
causalities of these variables are different among the various coastal areas. Chapter 5 concludes 
the main results of the thesis, shows its limitations and gives direction for future work. 
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An Empirical Analysis of Chinese Housing Markets 
Chapter 1 
1. Situation of Chinese housing markets 
1.1 Introduction 
Chinese economy has achieved a great success in past decades. Economic growth in China 
increased at an annual percentage growth rate of GDP of 9.06 from 1989 to 2015. However, 
because of a slow decrease in the manufacturing and property investment, the annual growth rate 
of GDP reduced to 7.0% in the first quarter of 2015, which is the lowest growth rate since 2009
1
. 
With the announcement of “reform and opening-up” policy
2
, Chinese government has finally 
ended the socialistic housing system through housing marketisation in 1998. Along with the 
reform process, economic prosperity and urbanization has raised the demands for housing. The 
constantly improving standard of living induced people to buy houses. Since housing price is 
determined by both the supply side and demand side, in accordance with the market economy, the 
residents have more disposable income and freedom in purchasing products. At the same time, the 
needs of urban construction provide a great chance to the real estate industry. The sharp increase 
in both the supply and demand side makes housing prices grows rapidly during these years. Real 
estate prices rose from 1999 in 2799 yuan to 2013 of 8841 yuan. In a long period, the Large-scale 
investment has been the driven force for Chinese economy. Since 1992, Chinese government has 
treated the real estate industry as a key industry in China. The real estate investment has achieved 
a substantial increase. Given the background that China’s real estate market started late than some 
other countries in the world, the capital chain of real estate market has not been effectively 
integrated. Although there are multiple ways for real estate financing, bank credit is a major 
method of real estate financing throughout the whole process of housing construction and sales. 
From the governments’ point of view, we need to notice that local governments play an important 
role in Chinese real estate markets. For the reason that local governments act as the land providers 
                                                             
1 Data source: data economics, 2015, available at http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/gdp-growth-annual. 
2 “Reform and opening-up” policy is a program of economic reforms named “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics” in December 1987, which introduced market principles and carried out by two steps, one is from 
late 1970s to early 1980s, mainly involved opening up of the country to foreign investment and the agriculture 
decollectivization, the other is during late1980s to 1990s, including the privatization of some state-owned industry 
and lifting of price controls. Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_economic_reform 
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according to the land transform reform, and the enterprises’ land purchase fee is supposed to be an 
important source of government income. 
This chapter can be seen as an introduction to Chinese real estate markets. Firstly, it shows the 
importance of real estate market to economy and then gives a brief introduction on Chinese 
housing market, credit channel and land policy. Based on the given background, we propose some 
crucial questions about Chinese real estate markets. 
1.2 A brief introduction of Chinese housing markets 
In China, the development of real estate markets actually began in the 1980’s. Central government 
published the “Batching method about the housing system reforms in cities and towns” in 1988
3
. 
This policy indicated the housing system reform as one pivotal part of economic reform, and the 
housing system changing can gain huge effect on economic and political benefits. This act aims to 
realize the housing commercialization based on the requirements of socialist planned commodity 
economy. Real estate has officially been listed as the crucial industry in China after “decision of 
the state council on accelerating the development of tertiary industry” promulgated in 1992. Lots 
of measures on stimulating the housing markets have been published and foreign investment has 
begun to enter China’s real estate markets. However, the rapid development of China’s real estate 
actually started in 1998 when Chinese government issued the “The notice on further deepening 
reform on the urban housing system”. This notice emphasized on promoting housing 
commercialization and speeding up housing construction. For the reason of the reform, the 
effective demands for housing began to increase in a short time. Real estate market has entered a 
period of rapid development. In 1999, in order to corporate with national housing reform, national 
government implemented favorable policies on real estate tax to encourage housing market, and 
made a positive effect on secondary housing market
4
. Through a variety of development strategies, 
along with the continued population growth and urbanization, the real estate industry has entered a 
period of prosperity. 
  In addition, the completed commercial housing area was 158,197 thousand square meters in 
1997. However, by the end of 2002, the figure had arrived at 349,758 thousand square meters, 
                                                             
3 Source from: http://www.law110.com/law/guowuyuan/2083.htm 
4 The secondary housing market refers to private ownership of housing for sale or rental market. The main market 
players are housing property owners and consumers. Available at http://baike.baidu.com/view/1023790.htm 
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increased by 1.21 times
5
. At the same time, the concepts of urban residents about houses 
constantly changed. This change accelerated the process of commercialization of housing to some 
extent. Compared with 1997, the commodity housing sales reached 603.234 billion yuan in 2002 
and increased by more than 2.5 times. Individual requirements for housing have become the main 
housing market demands. Real estate industry has become an important industry which related to 
the residents’ quality of life. 
From 2003 to now, China’s real estate has entered a new period under the macroeconomic 
regulation and control. In the second half of 2003, there existed an obviously overheated 
investment in property market. The situation that real estate developers tend to occupied more land 
spread widely. The prices of building materials, such as comment and steel, rose rapidly during 
that period. As we all known that real estate industry has high industrial connection and driving 
ability. The overheated real estate investment produced strong demands for related industries and 
drove up other related industries’ prices. In order to prevent the economy from been overheated, 
central government started to adjust the macroeconomic policies including controlling land supply 
and strengthening credit risk management. Although central government has realized that stable 
housing prices contribute to the healthy development of the real estate market as well as 
sustainable development of national economy, the actual macroeconomic regulation by the 
government is not ideal. From table 1.1 and figure 1.1, it is obviously a series of policies 
published by the government which tend to have a certain inhibition effect in a short period. 
However, housing prices rebound soon after the regulation. The fluctuation tend was more 
significant after 2005. The effect of national macro-control on real estate industry was ineffective 
through this period. 
Table 1.1 Growth rate of commercial housing prices (unit: %) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
commercial housing prices 4.84 17.76 14.03 6.29 14.76 -1.65 23.18 7.50 6.46 8.10 7.71 
residential buildings prices 5.02 18.71 12.62 6.21 16.86 -1.90 24.69 5.97 5.68 8.75 7.73 
Source and notes: the data is calculated by using CEIC database. 
 
 
                                                             
5 Data comes from CEIC database. 
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Figure 1.1 Prices of commercial housing and residential buildings from 1998 to 2002 
Source: the data comes from CEIC database. 
 After thirty-year construction and development, China’s real estate market has gradually matured. 
According to Liu (2002), Chinese economy has experienced single supply-driven period and both 
supply and demand-driven period, then entered into single demand-driven period. Any time in the 
economy, investment makes an important role in the economy. We should notice that with the 
development of Chinese housing market, real estate credit has become an indispensable link in 
real estate reproduction and transaction. There is a close relationship between investment and 
credit. For many local governments, real estate industry is not only an important source of 
government revenue but also an engine for boosting local economies. Comparing with central 
government, local governments hold ambiguous attitudes towards real estate regulation and 
control. 
1.3 Real estate investment and economic growth in China 
1.3.1 Real estate investment and economic growth 
Government regulations on real estate market are important issues in lots of countries. From the 
1980s, Japanese real estate market reached a period of great prosperity. Its GDP growth rate 
achieved 16% from 1985 to 1988. However, the growth rate of land value reached 81%. This kind 
of prosperity did not last long. Real estate bubble burst put Japan’s economy into a long slump. 
For a long time, the growth rate of national income in American did not reach the growth rate of 
housing price. This made many families cannot afford their rent. With the outbreak of subprime 
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mortgage crisis in 2007, the global economy slipped into recession. China is enjoying the real 
estate boom which brings to the economic growth now. However, we need to learn lessons from 
Japan and the United States to prevent the real estate bubble burst. 
 Lots of papers talked about real estate and economic growth appeared in the late 20
th
 century. 
Growth rate of economy was the reason of the real estate investment’s growth while real estate 
investment did no contribution to economic growth (Harris and Gillies, 1963). Judging from this 
background, we might consider that lots of developing countries put real estate investment far 
behind manufacturing industry and infrastructure at that time. However, an increasing number of 
researchers insisted the idea that real estate development should be the driven force of economy 
since 1970. Because real estate was not only a large-scale industry with a multiplier effect, but 
also a department which can drive many external effects. Some researchers affirmed real estate 
investment had one-way effect on economy growth. Housing investment and economic growth 
have causality running in both directions using data from 14 countries in western-Europe (Wigren 
and Wilhemsson, 2007). Construction investment leads to economic growth, but economic growth 
is not the reason for construction investment (Chang and Nieh , 2004). From global perspective, 
some studies analyzed the influence of real estate investment on economic growth. Turin(1973) 
researched the major economies of the world in 1970’s, and found that construction industry in 
developed countries make contribution rate to GDP at 5%-8%; while 3%-5% in developing 
countries. Ofori and Han (2003) combing the data about construction industry’s development of 
China’s provinces, the results affirmed that construction industry does have a positive effect on 
macroeconomics. At the same time, since the differences among various provinces in resource 
endowment and infrastructure, construction industry has different effect on economies. To sum up, 
most of the studies believed that real estate investment has an impact on economic growth. 
1.3.2 The development of real estate investment in China 
As an important part of the national economy, real estate industry can promote cities’ development, 
drive related industrial grows and increase local governments’ fiscal revenue. We need to 
understand the status and role of real estate industry and enact reasonable policies in order to make 
a healthy environment for real estate industry. 
 Investment means putting capital and property into some activities in order to obtain certain 
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income or social benefits
6
. Real estate investment is a kind of specific activities, including real 
estate development, management, matched service establishment and so on. There are two types 
of real estate investment. One is productive real estate investment and another is non-productive 
real estate investment. Industrial investment and commercial investment belong to the productive 
investment. Residential housing investment and administrative real estate investment are classified 
as non-productive real estate investment. 
 Real estate investment requires enormous amount of money, investors can hardly take charge by 
their own efforts. Gathering the investment funds from multi-channel is a usual way for real estate 
financing. The main funding sources include five ways as below. (1) Companies’ own capital. 
Real estate administration law stipulated that companies’ registered capital’s share of total 
investment should not less than 30%. (2) Credit funds, which mean the lending capital from 
commercial banks and non-bank institution, including loan secure by deposit, real estate mortgage 
and short-term loans. Companies or consumers need to pay the principal and interest to the bank at 
expiration date. (3) Public funds and property presales. Public funds include publishing enterprises’ 
bond, enterprise stocks and so on. Property presales refer to the sales charge in advance before real 
estate projects’ completion. (4) Foreign investment covers the shares, loans and direct investment. 
(5) Fiscal funds. The fiscal funds for real estate investment are generally distributed in the form of 
loans. Only part of the financial funds was provided for free. 61.32% of real estate development 
funds come from commercial banks, even reach 80% or more ( Wang et al., 2007). 
                                                             
6 The definition comes from the book published by Renmin university of China and Mcgill university of Canada. 
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Figure 1.2 Real estate investment and GDP from 2000 to 2013 
Source: the data comes from China statistical yearbook. 
 As shown in figure 1.2, the development of real estate investment in China has experienced a 
steadily rising trend along with the economic development. The ratio of real estate investment in 
national economy becomes higher. Since 1998, in response to the Asian financial crisis impact on 
China, the government proposed an idea of paying attention to residential housing construction 
and making it become a new source of economic growth. Real estate investment reached 
86,013.38 trillion yuan in 2013 and the ratio of real estate investment in GDP arrived at 15.1%. 
Compared to the data in 2000, the proportion in 2013 increased nearly three times.  
1.3.3 The real estate investment and credit in China 
Real estate industry can’t depart from the support of credit funds. Recent years, ratio of credit fund 
to the whole real estate funds accelerated at a growing rate. The ups and downs of real estate 
industry are subject to financial policy. Credit basically involves in the whole process of real estate 
development and sales. Zhang (2011) studied real estate enterprises’ financing problems under the 
tightening real estate credit situation in the view of real estate enterprise capital chain. Through the 
financing difficulties in middle or small-sized enterprises and the strengthen regulations on real 
estate, Zhang believed that financing constraints need to be relaxed. Establishing real estate 
investment trust fund is a feasible way to expand financing channels. Shi and Liu (2008) 
investigated the real estate enterprise management efficiency by DEA model. They took real estate 
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companies as research samples and showed that large enterprises’ efficiency is higher than the 
small and medium enterprises’ efficiency. Sun (2007) believed that there exist regional differences 
in the operating efficiency of real estate enterprises in China. 
1.4 China’s real estate credit and its influencing factors 
1.4.1 The definition and characteristics of the real estate credit 
Credit is a kind of unilateral assignment of the capital value subject to the payment of principal 
and interest. On one hand, entities and individuals put their own idle money into commercial 
banks and form the banks’ debt; on the other hand, the entities or individuals which lack of money 
borrow the money from commercial banks then put the money into the reproduction process and 
form the banks’ assets. Commercial banks act as the credit intermediary in the process of credit. 
 The real estate credit refers to the loans which offering by commercial banks for real estate 
construction and purchase. Real estate credit treats properties as service objects, containing 
production and operation process. The main source of credit funds comes from real estate 
residential fund and saving deposits. Real estate credit is one of the most active businesses in 
traditional bank management. Lots of national governments always use real estate credit rather 
than government allocation to support the housing construction. In abundant cases, in order to 
support the real estate construction and purchase, the governments enact some measures to give 
preferential, such as tax reduction, liberalizing the condition of loans and encouraging the banks to 
provide financial support through credit. 
 Both real estate credit and housing prices are affected by macroeconomic environment in China. 
Real estate credit has the following characteristics. (1) Specific use. Real estate credit is dedicated 
to the real estate’s reproduction and consumer purchase. (2) Longer period. There are two reasons 
to explain why it needs a longer period for real estate credit. One is that real estate faces longer 
production period. The development cycle of real estate includes project planning, land purchase, 
construction and marketing. The whole cycle needs supports from commercial banks. For another 
reason, since the expensive real estate value, a huge amount of housing buyers do not have 
abilities of paying the housing fund at one-time, they requires installment payment. The time limit 
of personal housing loan can be as much as thirty years. Therefore, both the house development 
credit and house mortgage loan have long period. (3) The loan fund management is concentrated. 
9 
 
A number of countries established dedicated credit agencies to manage the real estate credit funds, 
such as the British building societies and Japanese housing financial public treasury. In China, 
there exists a specific real estate credit institution to supervise the establishment of housing fund 
and grant the housing loans. These agencies guarantee the steady increase in housing funds for 
construction and also maintain the order for financing channels. (4) High risk. The dominant risk 
comes from the mismatching in the duration of deposit and lending money. The main source of 
housing credit comes from general deposit and the period is about only five years. The payment of 
deposit often has great rigidity on the maturity date. However, the duration of bank loan is quite 
long, which results in that the assets and liability of real estate credit are not matching. 
Commercial banks always face a great risk of liquidity. 
1.4.2 The classification of the real estate credit 
Categorizing real estate credit by different users, we can divide the credit into two parts. One is 
real estate development loan and the other is personal housing mortgage loan. 
 Real estate development loan represents the bank loans to real estate development enterprises 
which were used for long-term projects, such as development and construction in commercial 
buildings and residence buildings. The duration of real estate development loans is basically no 
more than three years. 
 There exist three characteristics in real estate development loan. (1) The loan amount is 
extremely huge. According to the regulation of Chinese central bank, the maximum amount of 
loan can reach 65% of the total project’s amount. (2) Long period. Generally speaking, the cycle 
of real estate development is about three to five years or even longer, which lead to a long cycle of 
money collecting. (3) High risk. Real estate development cares about the expected revenue, yet the 
expected revenue accordance with uncertainty since it can be affected by the macroeconomic 
environment and residential income level. 
 Personal housing mortgage loan means that residents treat their own house as collateral, borrow 
money from the bank according to a certain proportion of the total housing amount, and partial to 
repay the principal and interest in accordance with prescribed time limit. This kind of loan is 
mainly used for solving the problem of insufficient funds. The characteristics of personal housing 
loan include three points. (1) Long period. The maximum of limit can reach 30 years, usually 
10 
 
between 5 to 20 years. (2) Loans account for high proportion of total amount. The down payment 
generally floating around 30%, which means that the rest of amount can apply for personal 
housing mortgage loan. (3) In order to guarantee the safety of bank loan funds, personal housing 
mortgage is usually treat houses as their collateral. 
 Figure 1.3 depicts that both real estate development loan and credit loan presented an upward 
trend during 2005 to 2013, which shows that commercial banks pay attention to provide financial 
support to real estate construction and consumption. However, the growth rate seems limited in 
2008. It is noteworthy that the amount of real estate development loan is larger than the amount of 
personal mortgage loan at any period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3 Real estate credits from 2005Q1 to 2013Q3 
Source: the data comes from CEIC database. 
1.4.3 Housing price and credit 
Because of the real estate market liquidity and information asymmetry of financial markets, real 
estate is always considered to be collateral, further become a measure of the borrower’s borrowing 
ability. Real estate and bank credit are closely linked with each other. We should also notice that a 
large portion of the property which belongs to financial system has a great connection with 
housing prices. From another point of view, real estate is a capital-intensive industry. Bank 
lending is one of the main sources of funds for real estate enterprises. Since real estate industry 
has high profit margins, which indicates commercial banks have motivation of making asset 
allocation to real estate mortgage loans. Besides, real estate industry has a close connection with 
other industries. Macro economy can be affected through real estate industry. Then go a step 
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further, macro economy has effect on bank loans’ quality. Financial market has achieved the 
inter-temporal equilibrium of the real estate market consumption and investment. In the real estate 
booming period, higher expected returns leads to credit expansion. Kiyotaki and Moore (1994), 
Aoki (2004) studied the connection among real estate prices, credit and economy. Then confirmed 
the ability of borrowing is related to the real estate mortgage value. Increase in housing prices 
drive the borrowing capacity up and make output and investment grow. The new lending capital 
will flow into real estate market, which pushing up the housing prices. 
 Liquidity effect is mainly used to clarify the effect of real estate credit on housing prices. In 
economic theory, assets prices are determined by discounted cash flow. The money supply will 
increase and the market liquidity will strengthen when the amount of real estate credit goes up. It 
might cause decline in interest rate. Under the condition of given future revenue, lower interest 
rate makes the discount rate decrease, then leads to the present value of the real estate future 
earnings increase. For this reason, housing prices might go up in future. From another point of 
view, lower interest rate stimulates the investment for the housing market. Housing prices can be 
affected by the optimistic expectation of the economy. 
 Since the limitations of land supply and the long-term development of real estate cycle, the 
supply of real estate has certain rigidity. For that reason, we can treat the real estate as durable 
consumer goods with fixed supply temporarily. From the aspect of consumer, if commercial banks 
provide large amount of credit, which indicates the consumers can get houses more easily than 
before, the housing demand will start to rise. According to the market equilibrium theory, the real 
estate market demand curve will move up, and housing price increases. 
 Due to the nature of credit information asymmetry in the market, commercial banks always ask 
for collaterals as the condition of lending. The lending ability depends on the net wealth of 
collateral. In this way, when the housing prices go up, lending ability will rise accordingly, which 
leads to an increase in credit. From another point, commercial banks’ own assets contain plentiful 
real estates. Rising real estate prices result in rise of commercial banks’ capital value. At the same 
time, since the commercial banks have a huge amount of collaterals, they might feel safe to lend 
more money because of the increase in their risk tolerance. 
12 
 
1.5 A brief introduction of Chinese land policy and government spending 
1.5.1 The evolution of land transferring rights 
In 1978, in accordance with the “reform and opening-up”, a vast number of foreign-funded 
enterprises and private enterprises showed up in China All the enterprises that once used free land 
according to the national plan were no longer adapt to the requirement of Chinese development. 
The government began to explore the regulation on paid land use rights. Sino-foreign joint venture 
enterprise law stipulated that the joint ventures shall be levied land use fees. Since 1982, some 
cities (like Shenzhen and Guangzhou) attempted to adopt a paid land use measure. After that, the 
paid land use measure spread into hundreds of cities across China. However, the regulation of this 
period lagged behind, obviously reflected in the changed constitution in 1982 and the land 
management law in 1986. Both of the laws contained the terms that land rent is prohibited. 
 On December 1st 1987, Shenzhen city sold 8588 square meters’ land use rights (50-year) at 
auction for the first time. There were 44 enterprises involved in the auction, and one real estate 
company clinched a deal finally with 5.25 million Yuan. Land use rights become a commodity for 
the first time in China, thus began the land use system reform. In March 1988, the first session of 
the seventeenth National People’s Congress formally examined and approved the amendments to 
the constitution. The new provision for the land use transferring stipulated that any organization or 
individual cannot sell or illegally transfer by any other means land use rights. Land use rights can 
only be transferred accordance with the provisions of the law. 
 The state council of China issued the“interim regulations on urban state-owned land use right 
transferring” in 1990. It established the status of the property right of land and the land transfer 
rent by law, so as to construct the basic framework of the land mark system. In 1998, the central 
government promulgated “the land administration law of the People’s republic of China”. A 
striking feather of this period was that implementation of double-track land allocation system, 
namely administrative transfer and paid transfer existed at the same time. The allocated proportion 
was quite large. Market-driven means of land transferring such as bidding and auction only 
accounted for 5% of land deals. 
 In 2001, the state council recognized the need to strengthen the management of state-owned land 
assets (document NO.5). The document identified the leading position of the market in the 
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distribution of profit-oriented land. Except the land which can be provided through law’s 
allocation, other construction (which needed to use the state-owned land) can only be conducted in 
accordance with the law. In order to reflect the market economy principle and ensure the justice 
and fairness of land use right transactions, the ministry of land and resources issued “The 
regulation on state-owned land access of competitive bidding, auction and listing-for-sale”. This 
regulation explicitly requested that all kinds of land use for commercial purposes must transfer by 
bidding, auction or listing. In 2004, the state council issued the document “On deepening reform 
of land management decisions strictly”, and pointed out that industrial land should also create 
conditions to gradually implement the way of selling land use rights. This provision was further 
defined in the year 2006. The prices of industrial land use rights should not fall lower than the 
minimum standard. 
In 2009, the ministry of land and resources issued “About further implementation of the system 
for the transfer of land for industrial use”, put forward the idea that if the land which belong to 
agricultural land turns into the industrial land or the industrial land which provided by the 
government after approval, the government should take the way of IAL (tender/auction/listing) 
and public land price and land use right. 
1.5.2 The local government and land transfer 
Reviewing the trend of government land transfer income in ten years (table 1.2), we found that 
land transfer shows a relatively stable growth during this period. With growth of land transfer 
income, land use rights sales revenue accounted for fiscal revenue increased year by year. The 
land use rights income became “the second fiscal revenue of local governments”. 
 After the regulations on IAL (tender/auction/listing) were implemented in 2004, local 
government gained monopoly control over land supply. Because of that, local governments had 
advantages in promoting higher land prices. Two measures can be taken by local governments. 
One is controlling the land transfer area, which make the market supplies scarce. Demanders have 
to provide higher prices in order to get land use rights. Another is that since adopting the IAL 
(tender/auction/listing) which introduced competitive mechanisms, land use rights are always 
given to the competitor who offered the highest price. 
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Table 1.2 Land transfer income from 2001 to 2012 (unit: billion yuan) 
  
The land transfer income (accumulative 
total) 
The land income from bidding, auction 
and listing (accumulative total) 
2001  129.59 49.2 
2002  241.68 96.924 
2003  542.13 NA 
2004  589.41 325.37 
2005  550.52 392.01 
2006  767.69 549.21 
2007  1300 NA 
2008  973.7 906.82 
2009  1591 1509.8 
2010  2710 2600 
2011  3150 3020 
2012  2690 2550 
Source: the data comes from CEIC database. NA means that the data is not available. 
 Under the conditions of the existing situation, if housing prices go up higher, the real estate 
developers’ profit continues to rise, and local governments can attract real estate developers to 
building new houses by selling land use rights. Land is a scarce resource. For the sake of gaining 
diminishing land resources, real estate developers must push up the land price to get land use 
rights according to the law of supply and demand. 
 We have to mention that although land transfer income fell to 973.7 trillion Yuan in 2008, land 
transfer income rose violently to 1591 trillion Yuan in the following year. The transfer income 
grew more rapidly in 2010 and 2011. The IAL (tender/auction/listing) made a great contribution to 
the growth rate of land transfer income to some extent. As an important part of housing price, land 
transfer income volatility is bound to affect the real estate prices. 
 The so-called “land king” is a humorous way to refer to the real estate developers who get their 
expected plots at a high price. For the reason that the local governments act as monopolists in the 
land market, land demanders face great competition. This suggests that asymmetry and imbalance 
exist in the market. If there exist lots of “land kings”, people will worry about rising housing 
prices. In a market economy, the wealthy tend to put their money into real estate markets, even 
though they do not have the ownership of the land. They depend on the land use rights for capital 
and unlimited inflation of land prices, hoarding land, monopolizing national resources, exploiting 
workers, pursuing profits (which makes the house buyers unable to afford to enter the market), 
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and then becoming a new generation of the biggest land lords. In the 1990s, as a result of 
excessive heat in the real estate market, the “land king” phenomenon appeared in some big cities 
like Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. The record of “land king” continued to be refreshed. In 
September 2013, the ministry of land and resources convened the heads of the land departments 
who come from 13 provinces and 16 cities, and performed research about real estate land 
management and regulation. The ministry clearly proposed the target of bringing down the land 
price and maintaining the stability of land at the same time. The regulations tried to make sure 
there will be no “land kings” in the cities in which housing demand cannot satisfy housing supply. 
If housing supply is bigger than housing demand in some cities, the local government should 
accordingly reduce the land supplies in order to ensure that the land market runs smoothly. 
1.5.3 Local government fiscal expenditure situation analysis 
Differences in regional economic development can be affected through the local land income 
distinctions. The level of economic development was treated as an important target for local 
government performance review. From the data of local fiscal expenditure and supply of regional 
public goods, the governments’ fiscal expenditure level rose year by year. Reviewing the history 
of fiscal expenditure in China, we noticed that both the local fiscal expenditure and total amount 
of expenditure experienced a rapid growth. At the beginning of the “reform and opening-up”, local 
fiscal expenditure was low in China. Local fiscal expenditure first reached one trillion Yuan in 
2000. After that, the growth speed of government expenditure entered a period of vigorous 
increase. The expenditure on the projects (such as infrastructure, education and public welfare) 
related to the national economy and people’s livelihood increased greatly and met the needs of the 
development of China's economy. 
 Figure 1.4 visually shows the trend of total amount of financial expenditure and local fiscal 
expenditure. The ratio of local fiscal expenditure to the total amount of financial expenditure 
steadily went up, which indicated that the strength of support from local fiscal expenditure to 
economy and society was enhanced. We reach the conclusion that local fiscal expenditure’s 
growth can be due to local land transform income to a large extent. Apparently, this huge burden 
will eventually impute to the buyers through real estate prices. 
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Figure 1.4 Total amounts of the financial expenditure and local fiscal expenditure 
Source: the data comes from China statistical yearbook. 
  Due to the differences in levels of development of economies, the local fiscal income also has 
significant disparities. The need for providing infrastructure is diverse, thus the local fiscal 
expenditure has regional characteristics. In general, public expenditure significantly increased in 
many districts. 
 Table 1.3 shows that China’s local fiscal expenditures were low in 2002 and most local fiscal 
expenditures had increased by ten times by 2012. Growth rates in some provinces and cities are 
even greater. From the perspective of geographic position and economic level, local fiscal 
expenditure clearly showed unbalanced representation. Local fiscal spending was highest in 
Eastern China. Central China was next highest, and local fiscal spending was lowest in Western 
regions. Take the year 2012 for instance. The local fiscal expenditures of Shandong and 
Guangdong (which belongs to the eastern part) were 5904.52 trillion Yuan and 7387.86 trillion 
Yuan respectively. These were much higher than those of Qinghai and Xinjiang in western part of 
China; the local fiscal expenditures of these two provinces were 1159.05 trillion Yuan and 2720.07 
trillion Yuan respectively. Obviously, there are great differences in the level of public services. 
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Table 1.3 Provinces and cities spending list (Unit: RMB in trillion) 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Beijing 628.35 734.8 898.28 1058.31 1296.84 1649.5 1959.29 2319.37 2717.32 3245.23 3685.31 
Tianjin 265.21 312.08 375.02 442.12 543.12 674.33 867.72 1124.28 1376.84 1796.33 2143.21 
Hebei 576.59 646.74 785.56 979.16 1180.36 1506.65 1881.67 2347.59 2820.24 3537.39 4079.44 
Shanxi 334.27 415.69 519.06 668.75 915.57 1049.92 1315.02 1561.7 1931.36 2363.85 2759.46 
Neimenggu 393.57 447.26 564.11 681.88 812.13 1082.31 1454.57 1926.84 2273.5 2989.21 3425.99 
Liaoning 690.92 784.38 931.4 1204.36 1422.75 1764.28 2153.43 2682.39 3195.82 3905.85 4558.59 
Jilin 362.62 409.23 507.78 631.12 718.36 883.76 1180.12 1479.21 1787.25 2201.74 2471.2 
Heilongjiang 531.87 564.91 697.55 787.79 968.53 1187.27 1542.3 1877.74 2253.27 2794.08 3171.52 
Shanghai 877.84 1102.64 1395.69 1660.32 1813.8 2201.92 2617.68 2989.65 3302.89 3914.88 4184.02 
Jiangsu 860.25 1047.68 1312.04 1673.4 2013.25 2553.72 3247.49 4017.36 4914.06 6221.72 7027.67 
Zhejiang 749.9 896.77 1062.94 1265.53 1471.86 1806.79 2208.58 2653.35 3207.88 3842.59 4161.88 
Anhui 456.86 507.44 601.53 713.06 940.23 1243.83 1647.13 2141.92 2587.61 3302.99 3961.01 
Fujian 397.56 452.3 516.68 593.07 728.7 910.64 1137.72 1411.82 1695.09 2198.18 2607.5 
Jiangxi 341.38 382.1 454.06 563.95 696.44 905.06 1210.07 1562.37 1923.26 2534.6 3019.22 
Shandong 860.65 1010.64 1189.37 1466.23 1833.44 2261.85 2704.66 3267.67 4145.03 5002.07 5904.52 
Henan 629.18 716.6 879.96 1116.04 1440.09 1870.61 2281.61 2905.76 3416.14 4248.82 5006.4 
Hubei 511.39 540.44 646.29 778.72 1047 1277.33 1650.28 2090.92 2501.4 3214.74 3759.79 
Hunan 533.02 573.75 719.54 873.42 1064.52 1357.03 1765.22 2210.44 2702.48 3520.76 4119 
Guangdong 1521.08 1695.63 1852.95 2289.07 2553.34 3159.57 3778.57 4334.37 5421.54 6712.4 7387.86 
Guangxi 419.56 443.6 507.47 611.48 729.52 985.94 1297.11 1621.82 2007.59 2545.28 2985.23 
Hainan 92.257 105.4 127.2 151.24 174.54 245.2 357.97 486.06 581.34 778.8 911.67 
Chongqing 0.4594 1.6641 2.4488 3.1325 4.3001 4.4941 8.4872 14.89 30.312 44.36 52.861 
Sichuan 701.62 732.3 895.25 1082.18 1347.4 1759.13 2948.83 3590.72 4257.98 4674.92 5450.99 
Guizhou 315.57 332.35 418.42 520.73 610.64 795.4 1053.79 1372.27 1631.48 2249.4 2755.68 
Yunnan 526.89 587.35 663.64 766.31 893.58 1135.22 1470.24 1952.34 2285.72 2929.6 3572.66 
Shaanxi 404.91 418.2 516.31 638.96 824.18 1053.97 1428.52 1841.64 2218.83 2930.81 3323.8 
Gansu 274.55 300.01 356.94 429.35 528.59 675.34 968.43 1246.28 1468.58 1791.24 2059.56 
Qinghai 118.73 122.04 137.34 169.75 214.66 282.2 363.6 486.75 743.4 967.47 1159.05 
Ningxia 114.56 105.78 123.02 160.25 193.21 241.85 324.61 432.36 557.53 705.91 864.36 
Xinjiang 361.17 368.47 421.04 519.02 678.47 795.15 1059.36 1346.91 1698.91 2284.49 2720.07 
Source: the data comes from CEIC database. 
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 1.5.4 Housing price, Land transform and local government spending 
The land supply constraints have a role in promoting the land price and housing price. This point 
of view was confirmed by Pollakowski (1990). Peng and Wheaton (1994), using data from Hong 
Kong, analyzed the effect of land constraints on housing and land prices. The result showed that 
land supply pattern is a factor that explains the changes in land or housing prices. Some Chinese 
researchers started to care about land finance. The local governments tend to boost land prices in 
order to get more benefits. Housing prices also rise at the same time because the cost of houses 
goes up (Zhou and Du, 2010). Chen (2010) tried to find out the nature of land finance through 
local governments’ market behavior. Under the background of tax reform, Wang (2008) researched 
the causes of increasing housing prices and pointed out that the local governments rely too much 
on the real estate market. Oates (1969) researched the capitalization of tax-public service based on 
Tiebout model from three core indicators: community housing value, tax rate and housing value. 
Results indicated that there is intimate connection among those three indicators, in other words, 
the housing value is higher in the district where the tax rate is lower and the public service is 
better since local government spend much on the public service. The conclusion from Church 
(1974) and Meadows (1976) gave support to the point that the housing value will be affected by 
local government spending to some extent. 
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Chapter 2 
2. Real estate investment, credit limit and economic growth in China 
Based on the annual data from 31 provinces from 2006 to 2012, this paper uses threshold model to 
analyze the effect of real estate investment on economic growth. The findings show that: from the 
perspective of credit constraints, the influence of rising real estate investment to economic growth 
exist single threshold effect significantly. The effect of real estate investment on economic growth 
in the loose range of credit constraint is apparently greater than that in the tight range of credit 
constraint. If the credit constraint is tightened, the promotion of economic growth through real 
estate investment will be limited. Hence credit market needs to adjust to the target of economic 
growth. Under the premise that the healthy development of the economy is guaranteed, local 
governments should reduce the credit constraints appropriately and improve the efficiency of real 
estate investment. 
2.1 Introduction 
In 1998, in order to deal with the Asian financial crisis impact on China, the government proposed 
the idea of encouraging residential housing construction and making it become a new economic 
growth point. China’s real estate has experienced a steadily rising progress along with the 
economic development. The ratio of real estate investment in national economy has greatly 
increased in last ten years. Real estate industry can’t depart from the support of credit funds. 
Recently, the ratio of credit fund to the whole real estate funds becomes increasingly higher. The 
ups and downs of real estate industry are subject to financial policy. Lots of papers discussed 
about real estate and economic growth in the late 20
th
 century. According to Harris and Gillies 
(1963), the economic growth leads to the growth of the real estate investment while the investment 
growth cannot explain economic prosperity. Lots of developing countries put the real estate 
investment far behind manufacturing industry and infrastructure. However, an increasing number 
of researchers believed real estate development has been the driven force of economy since 1970. 
Because real estate is not only a large-scale industry with a multiplier effect, but also a department 
which can drive many external factors, such as reinforced concrete industry and furniture 
manufacturing. Gauge and Snyder (2000) used US State quarterly data from 1959 to 1999 and 
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examined the effect of housing investment on DP through impulse response function. They found 
that housing investment can significantly affect the GDP. Some researchers confirmed that real 
estate investment have one-way effect on economy growth. Ofori and Han (2003) collected the 
data of construction industry in China’s provinces, and their results affirmed that construction 
industry does have a positive effect on macroeconomics. 
In most of the developing countries, the proportion of indirect financing is greater than the 
proportion of direct financing. Financial institutions are social credit center, and credit plays a 
strong supporting role in national economies. Financial system is dominated by commercial banks 
in China, even though insurance companies and securities firms have been developing rapidly 
since the 1990s. The amount of increased loans through financial institutions was 24.40 trillion 
yuan, while the amount of financing by stocks was 1.60 trillion yuan during the period 1997 to 
2001 (Huang, 2009).  
Credit basically involves in the whole process of real estate development and sales. Over 60% 
of the real-estate capital is either directly or indirectly from the bank. Both bank credit and social 
overhead capital are main resources of investment. The credit channel mechanism of monetary 
policy describes the theory that central bank's policy change affects the amount of credit which 
commercial banks issue to companies and consumers. Conventional monetary policy transmission 
mechanisms, such as the interest rate channel, focus on direct effects of monetary policy actions. 
However in China, interest rates are not free due to government regulation. In the case that interest 
rate cannot reflect money supply and demand, the implementation of monetary intentions can be 
conducted through the change of bank credit amount. Credit control shows direct and fast impact 
on the actual output than interest rate does (Romer, 1993). 
Credit conditions and changes in the credit market are the main factor leading to real economic 
changes. Through the effect running from credit constraint to investment, Keynes considered 
economic exogenous shocks and credit allocation can affect each other. Since there exist 
asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders, changes in credit constraints can affect 
the borrowers’ credit demand and the lender’s credit supply. Then finally influence the real 
economic activity through consumption and investment (Fisher, 1933). Benito (2006) considered 
credit constrain is an important perspective to analysis changes in both real estate price and real 
estate market. Change in the down payment is one of the indicators to measure credit constraint. 
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Real estate demand can be affected by credit constraint. This makes real estate price change by 
demand, and in turn influences the real economy (Davis and Zhu, 2004). 
Companies are largely dependent on banks. Some small and medium enterprises are difficult to 
finance through other means because of their small size and inadequate financial situation. Their 
investment behaviors depend on the decisions of commercial banks’ lending to some extent. 
Zhang (2011) studied real estate enterprises’ financing problems under the real estate credit 
tightening situation in the view of the real estate enterprise capital chain. Through the financing 
difficulties in middle or small-sized enterprises and the strong regulation of real estate, Zhang 
believed that the strength of financing needed to be increased. Fan et.al (2012) found the change in 
the degree of credit constraint would impact the corporate capital investment and affect the output. 
Kashyap (1993) pointed out that constraint limit would decrease the loan supply and affect the 
enterprise investment. In sum, small and medium enterprises tend to cut back their investment and 
production, facing the credit constraints. Their investment and production can be more efficient 
compared with those of large state-owned corporation in China. Thus, tighten credit may lead to 
the inefficiency of the economy. 
Ludvigson (1998) paid attention to the impact of corporate loans and private sector loans to 
macro economy. If the credit policy tightens up, in the credit channel conduction, it will firstly 
cause decline in consumer loans, and then reduce consumption of the whole society, thus directly 
affect output. Ye (2014) found that during the credit squeezing period, credit allocation of 
resources was more likely to take care of stable employment and state-owned enterprises rather 
than economic efficiency goals. Xia(2011) mentioned that credit squeezing influenced the 
investment decision and brought higher financing cost to enterprises, which made some of the 
potential investment unachievable, resulted in less effective investment, then impacted the macro 
investment efficiency. 
Many researches elaborated the influence of real estate investment on economic growth through 
accelerating theory of investment and investment multiplier theory. Real estate investment has 
multiplier effect which can affect both the fixed-assets investment and consumption. Industry 
association refers to the relationship of the industries in national economy, including input and 
output, supply and demand. Therefore, real estate development might produce the chain effect on 
other related industries. Research group of national bureau of statistics in China (2000) roughly 
22 
 
estimates that 100 yuan of real estate demand will ultimately create the total output of 315 yuan. 
Because of the external effect, credit constraint on both real estate and other related industries can 
influence each other. Decline in other related industries have effect on real estate industry. 
Similarly, if real estate industry decreases, their demand for building material will also face a 
downturn phase, and then impact the whole economy. 
It is noteworthy that under the central government’s evaluation system on local governments, 
competition among local governments relies on local GDP growth, while GDP growth 
competition mainly depends on the size of investment. In order to achieve investment growth, 
local governments take some measures. One of these measures is increasing financial sources. The 
main forms of increasing financial sources are local government’s debt and providing credit 
support to enterprises by financial institution. As reform of China’s tax system carried out in 1994, 
central government controls more concentrated and stable tax revenue than local government does. 
The return of taxes for local government is diminishing, which increase local governments’ 
financial pressure. Therefore, in order to promote local economic development and make up 
shortage in government’s financial ability, local governments tend to intervene in the resources 
allocation of financial markets. Provincial governments have the power to make suggestions to 
local banks to encourage local economic development. In addition, local governments do not 
welcome cross-border financial flows in order to finance local investment. Under this background, 
this paper attempts to investigate the impact of real estate investment on the economic growth in 
different credit constraint regimes. 
2.2 Data 
The provincial-level data comes from the CEIC database, China statistical yearbook and CEI.net, 
covering the period from 2006 to 2012 for 31 provinces and cities. The variables in this study 
include following variables: 
(1) The growth rate of GDP (GGHP). The data comes from China statistical yearbook. 
(2) Logarithmic form of foreign direct investment (LNFDI). FDI is obtained by actual use of 
foreign investment multiplied by the average exchange rate of RMB. 
(3) Logarithmic form of government spending (LNGOV). 
(4) Real effective exchange rate (REER). 
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(5)Logarithmic form of regional highway length (LNROAD). LNROAD represents the 
infrastructure construction in 31 provinces. 
(6) 3 – 5 year lending interest rate (R). 
(7) Logarithmic form of real estate investment (INV). 
(8) Credit constraint (CC). The paper uses new mortgage loan amount (real estate companies 
and individual mortgage loans)/GDP. This kind of measurement is based on the researches of 
Bayoumi (1993), Sarno and Taylor (1998). Table 2.1 summarizes the data’s descriptive statistics. 
2.3 Methodology 
2.3.1 Introduction of panel threshold regression model 
We employ the threshold regression approach suggested by Hansen (1999) as the most appropriate 
model specification to carry out this analysis among real estate investment, economic growth and 
credit constraint. Real estate investment tends to associate with credit constraint, while investment 
efficiency can lead to the change in economic growth. The economic performance will respond 
differently to changes in real estate investment in an easing credit environment from how it 
responds in tightening circumstances. In a tightening credit constraint environment, middle and 
small sized enterprises will significantly deteriorated by limited opportunities. Therefore, we 
expect the effects of real estate investment on economic growth would be different under various 
credit constraint levels. 
In this chapter, we use the threshold estimation to split the sample along credit constraint levels. 
Threshold regression method is developed by Hansen(1990)
7
. This method is supposed to be used 
for balanced and non-dynamic panels. Single threshold model is given by 
         
               
                                                   
where   and   indicate individual and time, respectively.     is scalar and     is threshold 
variable. We can change structural equation (2.1) into another form: 
     
     
                   
     
                  
  
As seen from the equations above, the observed samples can be divided into two ‘regimes’. 
Differing slopes are generated by threshold value . If     is bigger than threshold value , 
regression slope is   .    is regression slopes when     is less than  . The error     is assumed 
                                                             
7
 Reference: Hansen B E. Threshold effects in non-dynamic panels: Estimation, testing, and inference[J]. Journal 
of econometrics, 1999, 93(2): 345-368. 
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to be independent and identically distributed. 
 When we due with panel data model, a common approach is removing the individual effect   . 
We first use ‘individual-specific means’ method to eliminate individual effect. To determine the 
exact threshold value, Hansen (1999) recommends least squares method. By getting the smallest 
sum of squares errors, the fittest   can be accepted. There also exist some other possibilities like 
multiple thresholds. In order to solve this problem, we first look for one threshold value, and fix 
the first threshold value. Then search the other potential threshold values on the right or left side 
of first value by least squares method. Once the threshold value is obtained, the slope coefficient 
can be confirmed. A crucial question we need to confirm is whether threshold effect in (2.1) is 
exists or not. The null hypothesis of no threshold effect can be shown as follow 
          
When the null hypothesis is accepted, the threshold value cannot be identified and we should 
not tell threshold effect exist. The likelihood ratio test of    is based on statistics       
         
  , where    and    are the constrained and unconstrained sum of squared residuals 
respectively. Hansen (1996) proposed a bootstrap method to stimulate the asymptotic distribution 
of likelihood test. Treat     and     as given variables, fix their values in repeated samples and 
estimate regression residuals   
 .Then resample the residuals by individual:    
      
     
       
  . 
    
     
       
   is the empirical distribution for bootstrapping. Bootstrap the sample with 
replacement and use this sample to estimate the model under null hypothesis and constrained 
hypothesis. We can calculate   statistic through above procedures respectively. Repeat these 
steps for 1,000 times and get 1,000 likelihood ratio statistics  , then calculate the percentage of 
draws for which the simulated statistics exceed the actual ones. The percentage is so-called 
p-value. The null hypothesis is rejected if p-value is smaller than critical value which we need in 
our model. 
Another problem should also be noticed. We need to confirm the confidence intervals for   via 
likelihood ratio statistic. Null hypothesis is        . Where                         
 . 
Under null hypothesis, the distribution function has the inverse 
                    
from which it is easy to calculate critical values. For instance, the 10% critical value is 6.53 and 
the 5% is 7.35. 
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2.3.2 Panel threshold panel in our research 
In this paper
8
, we estimate economic growth as function of real estate investment, government 
spending and so on. In order to make the results more convincible, we add some variables which 
have explained effect on economic growth but independent of the key variables as control 
variables. Then build model as follows: 
                                                               
                                                                                                            
 In equation (2.2), GGDP means the growth rate of GDP, FDI represents foreign direct investment, 
GOV is local government spending, REER means real effective exchange rate, ROAD stands for 
infrastructure construction, R is interest rate of lending, INV represents the real estate investment 
in  th region in the year  .      is the threshold variable.   means the threshold value which 
divided the observed variables into two regimes. The coefficients of INV are different in these two 
regimes. Where, GGDP is the explained variable. 
2.4 Empirical analysis 
Panel threshold regression model includes three steps. Firstly, removing fixed effects from panel 
data and estimating the threshold value  , then obtaining the coefficient of variables. Secondly, 
finding out whether the threshold effect is statistically significant or not. Through bootstrap 
procedure to simulate the F statistic value, if obtained p-value is small enough, we can reject the 
null hypothesis that there is no threshold effect. Third part of panel threshold regression is to 
check whether the threshold value is true and constructing the confidence interval. 
 Table 2.2 depicts the existence of threshold effect. The result rejects the null hypothesis that there 
is no threshold effect in panel regression model in 1% level of significance. Table 2.3 gives us the 
real threshold value is 0.024, 95% confidence interval is between 0.018 and 0.033. The estimation 
indicates that the influence of real estate investment on economic growth significantly exists in the 
threshold effect through the restraint of credit. Threshold value is 0.024, which illustrates the 
observed samples need to be divided into two regimes according to credit constraint. Comparing 
the two regimes, it is easy to find that the influence of real estate investment of economic growth 
                                                             
8
 The threshold program codes are derived from Lian yujun. He is a professor in Sun Yat-Sen University in China. 
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is different in the regimes. When the credit constraint is not bigger than threshold value 0.024, an 
increase in real estate investment will lead to economic growth rise by 1.2155. When a regional 
credit constraint level exceeds the threshold value 0.024, an increase in real estate investment will 
bring economic rise by about 1.3767. The regression estimates indicate that the impact of real 
estate credit on economic growth depending on the development of the regional credit markets. In 
different regimes, the credit market development degree is various and the strength of credit 
constraint is also different. Promoting effect of real estate investment on economic growth is 
obviously various since the different situation of regional credit market. Therefore, in the regime 
of easing credit constraints, real estate credit investment is more effective to stimulate the 
economic growth. 
 As shown in table 2.5, single threshold value divides the samples in 31 provinces into two 
regimes, the easing credit constraint regime (          ) and tightening credit constraint 
regime (          ). From table 4.4, we discover that vast majority of Chinese provinces are in 
the regime of tightening credit constraint in recent years, and only a few provinces stay in the 
regime of easing credit constraint. Through careful observation we can find that the provinces 
which in loose range of credit constraint happen to be relatively developed economic level regions, 
such as Beijing, Shanghai and some coastal provinces. There are also some national key areas in 
easing credit constraint regime for some years. In most of the western provinces, real estate 
development is not so efficient to drive up the economic growth than in other provinces. It is 
noteworthy that Beijing reached the credit constraint threshold value every year from 2006 to 
2012. Beijing, China’s capital city, has the economic decision-making right in China which 
controls the economic lifeline of the country. The economic atmosphere of Beijing is quite active 
and the investment is relatively easy to attract because of good expectations for the economy. We 
notice that no provinces except Beijing reached the easing credit constraints threshold value in 
2008. 
 To sum up, the estimate results illustrate the influence of real estate credit on economic growth is 
non-linear. There is a great gap in the regional development of credit level in China. The regions 
where economy is more developed have been gradually across the threshold value. In general, the 
restraint of China’s credit is tight, which indicates that the efficiency of real estate investment on 
economic is lower. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
Based on panel threshold regression model (Hanson (1999)), our paper analyzes the different 
impacts of real estate credit on economic growth depending on the development of the regional 
credit markets. From the perspective of credit constraint, the influence of real estate investment 
has significant single threshold value. Most of Chinese provinces and cities do not pass the 
threshold value 0.024. The credit constraint behaves in a tightening situation, which illustrates that 
the development of China’s credit market is still relatively low. It has hampered the influence of 
real estate market on economic growth to some extent. 
 We propose some suggestions as follow: (1) Commercial banks should increase the proportion of 
loans (the ratio of real estate mortgage lending values to real estate value) for small and medium 
enterprises. (2) Local governments should promote the construction of credit system and improve 
the credit environment. 
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Table 2.1 Descriptive statistics of data 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
GGDP 217 12.63548 2.142209 5.4 19.1 
LNFDI 217 4.90569 1.707423 0.192154 7.721678 
LNGOV 217 7.400337 0.756067 5.162154 8.907593 
DREER 186 3.070372 3.533837 -2.25235 6.712242 
ROAD 217 11.21709 0.835753 9.029537 12.40097 
DR 186 0.123056 0.807274 -1.53 0.87 
LNINV 217 6.65693 1.318289 1.635924 8.733288 
CC 217 0.014917 0.012628 0.000111 0.063813 
 
Table 2.2 Test for threshold effects 
Test for single threshold 
F1 12.817
***
 
p-value 0.000 
(1%,5%,10% Critical values) (8.676,6.374,5.565) 
*,**
and 
***
 indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of significance, 
respectively. 
 
Table 2.3 Asymptotic distribution of threshold estimate 
Threshold variable Threshold value 95% confidence interval 
CC 0.024 (0.018,0.033) 
 
Table 2.4 Regression estimates 
Regressor Coefficient estimate t p>t 95% conf. Interval 
InFDI 0.6830
**
 2.13 0.035 (0.0496, 1.3164) 
InGOV -5.2134
***
 -5.91 0.000 (-6.9562,-3.4707) 
DREER -0.2773
***
 -6.39 0.000 (-0.3630, -1.9160) 
INROAD 5.2439
***
 4.34 0.000 (2.8577, 7.6301) 
DR 0.3803
*
 1.92 0.057 (-0.0114, 0.7720) 
ININV(CCit<=CCT1) 1.2155
**
 2.18 0.031 (0.1130, 2.3179) 
ININV(CCit>CCT1) 1.3767
**
 2.46 0.015 (0.2691, 2.4843) 
*,**
and 
***
 indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of significance, 
respectively. 
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Table 2.5 Detailed information of credit constraint 
CC 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Beijing 0.03337 0.044887 0.025691 0.053424 0.036757 0.026368 0.028024 
Shanghai 0.002223 0.062484 0.011815 0.027929 0.013974 0.008441 0.0117 
Tianjin 0.007855 0.009218 0.005074 0.01011 0.005147 0.006404 0.005035 
Hebei 0.000931 0.00481 0.005513 0.010872 0.011831 0.010097 0.01045 
Shanxi 0.000111 0.00211 0.002108 0.003972 0.007539 0.00573 0.005957 
Neimeng 0.000144 0.001731 0.001241 0.003371 0.003439 0.005132 0.004136 
Liaoning 0.001207 0.008807 0.007875 0.014519 0.015111 0.014627 0.013372 
Jilin 0.001923 0.002533 0.002826 0.008031 0.007936 0.008635 0.007103 
Heilongjiang 0.001596 0.002027 0.002092 0.006159 0.006231 0.005566 0.006521 
Jiangsu 0.006158 0.022775 0.019299 0.040821 0.037185 0.023304 0.026261 
Zhejiang 0.017138 0.029971 0.022476 0.044185 0.035426 0.020271 0.022941 
Anhui 0.006497 0.018507 0.017082 0.035122 0.036377 0.028172 0.031536 
Jiangxi 0.000899 0.011613 0.009638 0.015409 0.015456 0.014033 0.018731 
Shandong 0.001238 0.004674 0.004965 0.010226 0.011397 0.010421 0.010245 
Henan 0.001838 0.007829 0.005495 0.010668 0.010793 0.007219 0.010984 
Hubei 0.003628 0.015493 0.00796 0.01763 0.019728 0.013499 0.014758 
Hunan 0.001974 0.008555 0.006911 0.014867 0.016969 0.016856 0.017557 
Guangdong 0.007547 0.019003 0.013187 0.023603 0.021172 0.017314 0.019647 
Fujian 0.003448 0.045097 0.022293 0.037646 0.028378 0.026713 0.03551 
Guangxi 0.010417 0.015586 0.014233 0.028088 0.032579 0.022193 0.026028 
Hainan 0.000835 0.005599 0.007366 0.015656 0.03259 0.006014 0.008003 
Sichuan 0.00334 0.018173 0.012549 0.025869 0.027037 0.022004 0.023202 
Guizhou 0.002161 0.010116 0.008609 0.023027 0.025022 0.021466 0.023923 
Yunnan 0.007401 0.019587 0.017995 0.033326 0.028928 0.024201 0.025046 
Chongqing 0.014324 0.047323 0.02614 0.052354 0.063813 0.049653 0.047365 
Xizang 0.001183 0.005016 0.000602 0.004879 0.000886 0.000785 0.002443 
Shaanxi 0.003496 0.008269 0.008831 0.016517 0.02335 0.020792 0.015702 
Gansu 0.001309 0.003273 0.004533 0.007448 0.006034 0.006369 0.007223 
Qinghai 0.000804 0.002498 0.001007 0.005117 0.004739 0.004487 0.009354 
Ningxia 0.004713 0.008637 0.010659 0.023004 0.033587 0.027964 0.025816 
Xinjiang 0.002259 0.008667 0.007129 0.016957 0.017869 0.014267 0.015329 
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Chapter 3 
3. Real estate prices and credit in China 
Housing prices are affected by regional economic fundamentals. In this case, exploring the impact 
of primary determined economic factors on regional real estate markets is our topic of interest. In 
this study, we have selected 22 provinces and divided them into coastal provinces and inland 
provinces. By means of the panel vector auto regression (PVAR) model, we investigate the 
dynamic relationships between housing prices and credit (including development lending and 
housing loans) in coastal and inland regions. The results imply that the amount of housing loans 
has a strong effect on housing prices in mid-western provinces. Our findings explore provincial 
panel data (which are more detailed) instead of national data to give specific results for the two 
regions, and then provide policy recommendations based on different economic development 
levels. The results emphasized that in order to stabilize the development of the real estate market, 
different regulations should be implemented by local governments according to their own 
economic situations. 
3.1 Introduction 
Following a rapid transition in ideology, the real estate market in China has experienced a 
remarkable change in development. Even though the Chinese government remains a few planned 
economic factors, the government is attempting to change the economy from a planned economy 
to a market-oriented economy. With the announcement of the “reform and opening-up” policy, the 
government finally ended the socialized housing system through housing marketisation in 1998. 
Along with the reform process, economic prosperity and urbanization induced people to buy 
houses. As is the case with other commodities, real estate prices are determined by both demand 
side and supply side factors. The demand side includes disposable income, population and some 
other factors, while user cost, land supply and development lending are factors for the supply side. 
Chinese housing prices and rents have rapidly grown since the housing reforms were enacted, 
except for the period during financial crisis of 2008. Along with increased demand, housing 
supply also increased. China has experienced relatively high housing prices over the past two 
decades, running from 2,090 Yuan per square meter to 6,237 Yuan per square meter. Based on a 
number of references, we infer that not only China but also some other countries have experienced 
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rapid housing price inflation. Korea’s housing price has risen since the 1970s because of low 
interest rates and increasing bank loans for house purchasing. Therefore, the Chinese central 
government implemented several policies and regulations on the housing market, like controlling 
land supply, curbing property speculation and so on. These actions raised some questions, such as: 
How can a government regulate the real estate market from a macroeconomic perspective? Are 
current policies effective in promoting steady growth in the housing market? Have any 
heterogeneous effects appeared between different regions arising from different credit regulation 
policies? 
As a capital-intensive industry, all aspects of real estate development require financial support. 
Given that the financial environment in China involves indirect financing, commercial banks have 
become the key source of real estate capital. Bank credit funds’ support for real estate includes two 
aspects: real estate development loans and personal housing mortgage loans. Real estate 
development loans represent bank loans to real estate development enterprises used for long-term 
projects, such as the development and construction of commercial buildings and residential 
buildings. The duration of real estate development loans is generally not more than three years, 
usually taking the method of collateral. In the case of personal housing mortgage loans, residents 
treat their own house as collateral, borrow money from the bank to pay a certain proportion of the 
total housing amount and partially to repay the principal and interest in accordance within the 
prescribed time limit. This kind of loan is mainly used for solving the problem of insufficient 
funds. Both real estate development loans and credit loans exhibited an upward trend in recent 
years, which shows that commercial banks focus on providing financial support to real estate 
construction and consumption. The total amount of real estate development loans is larger than the 
amount of personal mortgage loans at any point in time. 
Many references analyze the relationship between housing price and credit. Some research 
focuses on the influence of real estate credit on real estate prices. The most common viewpoint 
identifies bank lending as one of the important factors that influences housing prices. Xin Wei Che 
et al. (2011) believed that property prices and bank lending have a long-run relationship, then 
provided evidence that bank lending plays an important role in pushing up property prices. Allen 
and Gale (1998) studied the influence of credit expansion on asset prices by the credit expansion 
of asset price model. The results indicated that credit capital will increase the preference of 
borrowers for risky assets, and ultimately lead to high asset prices. Borio and Lowe (2002) 
proposed that real estate credit expansion will result in increased asset prices. Through the 
financial accelerator mechanism, the expansion of real estate credit and growth in asset prices will 
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lead to the expansion of the real economy. 
Some research pays close attention to the effect of real estate prices on real estate credit. 
Hofmann, Davis and Zhu (2001) show that a positive relationship appears between bank lending 
and housing prices in the long term; the effect of housing prices on bank loans is quite obvious. 
On the other hand, Masahiro Inoguchi (2007), basing his research on a sample of 3 countries in 
East Asia, implies that fluctuations in real estate prices can impact domestic bank lending. Hyman 
P. Minky (1982) pointed out that increases in asset prices will make commercial banks too 
optimistic and relax the loan conditions during periods of economic prosperity. If real estate prices 
go higher, the value of commercial banks’ holding of the mortgage property will also increase. 
Thus, banking business will expand with increasing mortgage property value. 
Property prices are determined by regional supply and demand. Considering local conditions in 
determining property prices, nationwide figures may not show heterogeneity across provinces. For 
instance, Michael T. Owang et al (2005) using regional data, provide evidence that large 
differences exist in the effects of monetary policy shocks across regions of the United States. 
Garlo Altavilla (2000) also suggested the presence of asymmetric response to a monetary policy 
shock. 
In China, the traditional method is to partition the region into three zones, including the eastern 
zone, the central zone and the western zone. As we all know, the eastern zone, which includes 
most of the coastal province, has a solid economic condition and is famous for its export-oriented 
economy. Since population usually flows into more developed areas, which has artificially inflated 
housing prices in the coastal district, the real estate market in the eastern region shows different 
characteristics compared with other regions. Compared to the coastal areas, central and western 
regions tend to be economically inward-looking. The mid-western area (inland region) has 
experienced a serious brain drain. People are more inclined to go to the eastern part of China to 
work and live. Obviously, these two regions have large distinctions between each other. Therefore, 
we divide the regions into coastal provinces and inland provinces, and analyze these two regions 
respectively. 
Most previous diversity studies do not make a distinction between real estate development 
lending and housing loans. In this study, we focus on relationships among housing prices, real 
estate development loans and personal housing mortgage loans. Firstly, we try to find out whether 
house prices, real estate development loans and personal housing mortgage loans affect each other; 
then, we divide 22 regions into two groups and examine the effects between two groups; thirdly, 
we analyze the results of variance decompositions in the long run. The rest of this chapter is 
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organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model approach. Section 3 describes the data. Section 
4 estimates the model by using PVAR and discusses the empirical results. Section 5 provides 
conclusions and policy suggestions. 
3.2 Empirical methodology 
Taking housing price (HP), real estate development loan (DL) and personal housing mortgage 
loan (HL) as three variables, this paper used panel vector autoregression (PVAR)
9
, which is 
applied to analyze the linkage between these three variables. This method combines the traditional 
VAR approach with the panel data approach, which allows for unobserved individual 
characteristics and the time effects. The panel data approach contains a fixed effect, which can 
obtain provincial unobservable time invariant factors. It is important to notice that in order to 
avoid biased coefficients that are caused by the mean-differencing procedure, we use the Helmert 
procedure to replace the mean-differencing procedure. 
We give a first-order VAR model as follows: 
                                               
Where,    is a three variable vector {HP, DL, HL}.    and    represent an unobserved 
individual effect and time effect respectively.     satisfies the orthogonality condition: 
                                                 
Since this is a dynamic panel data model which contains fixed effects, we should first use the 
internal team mean difference method to remove time effect, then use forward mean-differencing 
referred to as the “Helmert procedure”(see Arellano and Bovor) to remove individual effects, and 
then obtain a consistent estimator of    by using the generalized matrix estimation 
method(GMM). 
Specifically, getting the mean value of each variable of in equation (3.1) respectively on 
provincial level: 
                                                 
Where      
      
 
    
If we use equation (3.1) minuses equation (3.3) may remove time effect, we can get: 
                                                      
Where             , and then we discuss about forward mean-differencing method in order 
to remove individual effect     , we need to get the total amount of some observation from time 
    to time   and then get the mean value of the total amount. Take      for example, 
                                                             
9
 Original program codes are derived from Inessa Love. She is working for the World Bank. 
34 
 
         
      
 
      . 
                                                   
Letting equation (3.4) minuses equation (3.5), we can get: 
                                                  
Adopting a forward mean-differencing method is more convincing, for the reason that this 
transformation preserves the orthogonality between transformed variables and lagged regressors. 
Therefore we use lagged regressors as instruments and estimate the coefficients by system GMM. 
3.3 Data and descriptive statistics 
Our provincial-level data comes from the CEIC database and CEI.net. We choose 22 provinces to 
do the analysis. For comparing the heterogeneous effect between regions, we divide 22 provinces 
into two groups based on the level of economic development and geographical position: one is the 
coastal provinces, and the other is the inland provinces (table 3.1). Quarterly data were used for 
finding the relationship among housing prices (HL), real estate development loans (DL) and 
personal housing mortgage loans (HL) of two regions in china. We analyze the credit from both 
the supply side and the demand side. On the supply side we use the real estate development loans 
in the real estate market, while on the demand side we use personal housing mortgage loans. Our 
sample period is from 2006Q1 to 2012Q4. Table 3.1 gives the list of provinces in the sample, 
while details on the sample selection are given in table 3.2. The housing price (HL) is a 
provincial-level variable. Real estate development loans (DL) and personal housing mortgage 
loans (HL) are national-level variables. All the variables we used are the logarithmic growth rates 
of the respective underlying variables. 
3.4 Estimation results  
Table 3.3 summarized the stable conditions for panel VAR, showing that all variables are found to 
be stationary at the 10% level of significance. Meanwhile, in order to compare the two groups 
better, we choose 1 lag by BIC criterion. Then, we estimate the coefficient of system in panel VAR 
after the fixed effects and time effects have been removed. We report the main results of the model 
with three variables in table 3.4 to table 3.6. Figure 3.2 and figure 3.3 show graphically impulse 
responses in two regions. 
3.4.1 Coastal provinces samples 
Fig 3.2 presents the impulse response for coastal provinces samples, where the solid line in the 
middle shows the impulse response function and the dashed lines on both sides are the confidence 
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interval. The response of housing price (HP) to personal housing mortgage loan (HL) is positive at 
a significance level of 10%, which suggests that an increase in personal housing mortgage loan 
can positively affect housing prices. When the personal housing mortgage loan is given a positive 
impact, housing prices will experience a positive rise. The response of HP to HL in the third 
period reaches 0.0148 and then begins to reduce, gradually stabilized thereafter. From the demand 
aspect, if the amount of personal housing mortgage loans grows in coastal provinces samples, 
which means that more consumers are finding it easy to get houses than before or there exists 
large amount of demand in housing market, it will push up the housing price because of the 
increase in demand. The response is consistent with Allen and Gale (1998), as we mentioned 
above. 
Next, we will focus on the response from the real estate development loan (DL) to housing 
price (HP). Real estate development loans exhibit a significant influence on housing prices. A rise 
in real estate development loans, which is caused by more optimistic expectations about future 
prospects, makes the borrowing capacities of real estate developers grow by increasing the value 
of their properties. When the real estate development loan is given a positive impact, housing 
prices will experience a positive rise and reach a peak value of 0.0186 in the fifth period. It is 
noteworthy that the response from real estate development loans to housing prices fell with a slow 
speed and this kind of shock will bring a longer influence to housing prices.  
Comparing the influences which come from two different types of loans to housing prices, we 
found that the response of real estate development loans to housing prices is much larger than that 
of personal housing mortgage loans. It is shown in table 3.4, peak value of response from DL to 
HP is 0.0186 and the peak value from HL to HP is 0.0148. The response of DL to HP fell more 
gradually. In the fifteenth period, the response from HL to HP turn into 0, however, the response 
from DL to HP is 0.089. Real estate development loans have a stable positive influence on housing 
prices. For the sake of the unique land transform system, both the real estate developers and 
consumers cannot have the ownership of land but retain the right to use the land. The real estate 
developers tend to treat the land use right as their capital. They sometimes buy the land use right 
but do not build houses on it immediately. Hoarding land and houses is a common phenomenon in 
China. The real estate development loan amount is extremely huge. According to the regulation of 
the Chinese central bank, the maximum allowable value of a loan is 65% of the total project value. 
The amount of real estate development loans is larger than the amount of personal mortgage loans 
at any point in time. Therefore, comparing to personal housing mortgage loans, real estate 
development loans have a greater impact on housing prices. 
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Now turning to the response of DL to HP and HL to HP, we notice that hardly any positive 
impact comes from HP on either DL or HL since the impulse responses are not significantly 
different from zero. Real estate development loans and personal housing mortgage loans cannot be 
affected by housing prices in coastal provinces. 
3.4.2 mid-western-provincial samples 
As shown in Fig 3.3, we note that the impulse response of house prices to personal housing 
mortgage loans clearly represents a positive impact. When a personal housing mortgage loan 
shock happens, the housing price experiences a positive trend, which indicates that if personal 
housing mortgage loans increase, it will generate a house demand increase, and make housing 
prices rise. As with coastal provinces, we also notice that in inland provinces, housing price 
increases in response to a real estate development loan shock. The long-term prosperity of the real 
estate industry in China has built optimism in real estate market. An increase in real estate 
development loans leads to more possibility of house financing, which pushes housing prices up. 
As we can see from Table 3.4, the impact of a real estate development loan to housing price is 
positive. However there is no significant response of either personal housing mortgage loans or 
real estate development loans to housing prices. 
3.4.3 Comparison between the two samples 
(1) We find that both personal housing mortgage loans and real estate development loans show 
significant influence on housing prices. Housing price increases in response to personal housing 
mortgage loans or real estate development loans. However, there are slight differences in two 
groups: housing price of coastal provinces is affected more by previous period personal housing 
mortgage loans. Both of the peak values from the two groups happened in the third period; the 
impulse responses are 1.0148 and 0.007, respectively. 
(2) At present, the effect of real estate development loans on housing prices is much stronger in 
coastal provinces. The peak value of the response from DL to HP is 0.0186 in coastal provinces 
and the peak value from DL to HP is 0.0057 in inland provinces. The government has attached 
great importance to the economic development of coastal areas for a long time. Long-term policy 
orientation leads to larger reliance on commercial bank credit in coastal provinces (Gao and Liang 
(2007)). Therefore, coastal provinces’ housing prices response to quantitative monetary policy 
regulation is stronger than for the inland provinces. 
(3) During the initial period, the response of housing prices to personal housing mortgage loans 
rises very quickly. Two areas reach their highest level in the third period. As we can also infer that 
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response of housing prices to personal housing mortgage loans declines much less and more 
slowly than real estate development loans does in both coastal regions and inland regions. This 
may be attributable to the fact that the amount of real estate development loans is larger than the 
amount of personal mortgage loans at any one time. 
Table 3.7 summarizes the variance decompositions. The orthogonalization of PVAR residuals 
allows us to isolate the response of variables from one to the other. We interpret our result as 
evidence that real estate development loan significantly accounts for housing price variation in the 
coastal region. Personal mortgage loans also show as an important factor in housing price 
variation. Over long periods, both real estate development loans and personal mortgage loans are 
obviously related to housing prices. However, the contributions of real estate development loans 
and personal mortgage loans to housing prices are almost the same in inland provinces. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this paper we presented a quarterly nationwide model and try to analyze the relationship among 
housing price and credit in china. We estimated 22 provinces and divided them into two groups by 
the level of economic development and geographic position. The results suggest provincial-level 
heterogeneity in the relationship of these factors. Compared with the inland area of China, the 
housing prices in coastal provinces seem to be more strongly affected by both real estate 
development loans and personal mortgage loans. Based on these conclusions, we offer the 
following recommendations: 
(1) Strengthen the management of the real estate credit. According to the empirical results 
above, we find that both real estate development loans and personal mortgage loans have strong 
effects on housing prices, which means controlling the amount of commercial credit can adjust the 
real estate prices. The adjustment of real estate development loans seems to be more efficient than 
the personal mortgage loans does in the coastal provinces. (2) We need to adopt a differentiation 
policy for different parts of the real estate credit policy. In the inland provinces, the credit has 
limited impact on the real estate market. Commercial banks need to broaden the real estate 
enterprise financing channel and make the credit channel more efficient in inland provinces. 
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Table 3.1 sample coverage across regions 
 Eastern provinces 
(Group 1) 
Mid-Western provinces 
(Group 2) 
Number  11 11 
Name  Beijing,Tianjin,Hebei,Liaoning, 
Shandong,Shanghai,Zhejiang, 
Jiangsu,Fujian,Guangdong,Hainan. 
Guangxi,Heilongjiang,Anhui,Jiangxi, 
Hubei,Hunan,Chongqing,Sichuan, 
Guizhou,Yunan,Henan. 
 
Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics of data 
Group 1 Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
 HP 0.125 0.118 -0.038 0.541 
 DL 0.213 0.107 0.067 0.441 
 HL 0.212 0.086 0.100 0.423 
Group 2 HP 0.117 0.070 -0.114 0.314 
 DL 0.213 0.107 0.067 0.441 
 HL 0.212 0.086 0.100 0.423 
 
Table 3.3 Stability conditions for panel VAR 
Group 1 
Modulus 
Group 2 
Modulus 
0.652 0.533 
0.465 0.103 
0.103 0.465 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 3.1 Stability conditions for PVAR 
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Fig 3.2 Impulse responses for coastal provinces sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 3.3 Impulse responses for inland provinces sample 
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Table 3.4 Impulse responses of housing price 
varname s hp dl hl 
    Group 1 Group2 Group 1 Group2 Group 1 Group2 
hp 0 0.0809 0.0561 0 0 0 0 
hp 1 0.0509 0.0278 0.0084 0.0029 0.0092 0.0049 
hp 2 0.0319 0.0137 0.0136 0.0044 0.0134 0.0067 
hp 3 0.0199 0.0066 0.0165 0.0052 0.0148 0.007 
hp 4 0.0124 0.003 0.0181 0.0056 0.0145 0.0066 
hp 5 0.0078 0.0012 0.0186 0.0057 0.0132 0.0059 
hp 6 0.0049 0.0002 0.0184 0.0056 0.0116 0.0051 
hp 7 0.0031 -0.0002 0.0178 0.0055 0.0097 0.0044 
hp 8 0.0021 -0.0005 0.017 0.0053 0.0079 0.0036 
hp 9 0.0015 -0.0006 0.0159 0.005 0.0063 0.003 
hp 10 0.0012 -0.0007 0.0147 0.0047 0.0048 0.0024 
hp 11 0.001 -0.0007 0.0135 0.0044 0.0035 0.0019 
hp 12 0.0009 -0.0007 0.0123 0.004 0.0023 0.0015 
hp 13 0.0008 -0.0006 0.0111 0.0037 0.0014 0.0011 
hp 14 0.0008 -0.0006 0.01 0.0034 0.0006 0.0008 
hp 15 0.0008 -0.0006 0.0089 0.0031 0 0.0006 
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Table 3.5 Impulse responses of real estate development loan 
varname s hp dl hl 
    Group 1 Group2 Group 1 Group2 Group 1 Group2 
dl 0 0.0044 -0.0026 0.0413 0.0414 0 0 
dl 1 0.004 -0.0048 0.0367 0.037 -0.0022 -0.0017 
dl 2 0.0037 -0.0055 0.0323 0.0328 -0.0039 -0.0032 
dl 3 0.0035 -0.0056 0.0283 0.0288 -0.0052 -0.0045 
dl 4 0.0033 -0.0053 0.0247 0.0252 -0.0061 -0.0054 
dl 5 0.003 -0.0049 0.0214 0.0219 -0.0068 -0.0062 
dl 6 0.0028 -0.0044 0.0184 0.0189 -0.0071 -0.0066 
dl 7 0.0026 -0.0039 0.0157 0.0161 -0.0073 -0.0069 
dl 8 0.0024 -0.0035 0.0133 0.0137 -0.0073 -0.007 
dl 9 0.0022 -0.0031 0.0112 0.0115 -0.0071 -0.007 
dl 10 0.002 -0.0027 0.0093 0.0096 -0.0069 -0.0069 
dl 11 0.0018 -0.0023 0.0077 0.0079 -0.0066 -0.0067 
dl 12 0.0017 -0.002 0.0063 0.0064 -0.0062 -0.0064 
dl 13 0.0015 -0.0017 0.005 0.0051 -0.0058 -0.0061 
dl 14 0.0013 -0.0014 0.004 0.004 -0.0054 -0.0057 
dl 15 0.0012 -0.0012 0.0031 0.0031 -0.0049 -0.0053 
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Table 3.6 Impulse responses of housing mortgage loan 
varname s hp dl hl 
    Group 1 Group2 Group 1 Group2 Group 1 Group2 
hl 0 0.0073 0.0046 0.0179 0.0187 0.039 0.0391 
hl 1 0.0035 0.0016 0.0204 0.0202 0.0347 0.0344 
hl 2 0.0014 -0.0001 0.0217 0.021 0.0302 0.0299 
hl 3 0.0003 -0.0011 0.0222 0.0213 0.0259 0.0257 
hl 4 -0.0002 -0.0018 0.0222 0.0211 0.0219 0.022 
hl 5 -0.0004 -0.0021 0.0216 0.0206 0.0182 0.0186 
hl 6 -0.0004 -0.0024 0.0207 0.0199 0.0149 0.0155 
hl 7 -0.0002 -0.0025 0.0197 0.019 0.012 0.0129 
hl 8 0 -0.0026 0.0184 0.018 0.0095 0.0105 
hl 9 0.0001 -0.0025 0.0171 0.0168 0.0073 0.0085 
hl 10 0.0003 -0.0025 0.0157 0.0157 0.0055 0.0067 
hl 11 0.0004 -0.0024 0.0144 0.0145 0.0039 0.0052 
hl 12 0.0005 -0.0023 0.0131 0.0133 0.0026 0.0038 
hl 13 0.0006 -0.0022 0.0118 0.0121 0.0016 0.0027 
hl 14 0.0007 -0.002 0.0105 0.0109 0.0007 0.0018 
hl 15 0.0007 -0.0019 0.0094 0.0099 0 0.0011 
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Table 3.7 variance decomposition 
  hp dl hl 
Panel1：coastal provinces sample 
hp 0.75 0.166 0.083 
dl 0.015 0.939 0.046 
hl 0.007 0.419 0.574 
Panel2：inland provinces sample 
hp 0.893 0.05 0.056 
dl 0.027 0.935 0.039 
hl 0.006 0.403 0.591 
Percent of variation in the row variable(10 periods ahead) explained column variable 
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Chapter 4 
4. Public finance and retail housing prices 
This study applies both normal granger causality approach and bootstrap panel granger 
causality test to find out whether there exists a causal relationship among housing price, land 
purchase fee and government spending in coastal provinces in China. The results show that 
the granger causalities of these variables are different among the various coastal areas. 
Through a comparison of the results, we notice that the provinces which rejected the 
hypothesis (one variable is not the granger cause of another variable) in the normal granger 
causality approach include almost all the provinces which have causal relations between 
variables in the bootstrap causality test. Our findings show that since the bootstrap method 
allows cross-sectional dependence, it is possible to exploit more efficient information to make 
estimation. 
4.1 Introduction 
Chinese economy has achieved a great success in past thirty years. The growth rate of GDP 
surpasses the world level since 1990. In a long period, large-scale investment has been the driven 
force for Chinese economy. Apparently, the public burden increases because of the invest-based 
economy. Due to the reason that real estate, which provides a high return on investment, is always 
considered as investment goods. The real estate industry is also related to the basic livelihood of 
residents. According to the above description, government concerns about the development of real 
estate industry in China. 
In previous decades, the Chinese real estate market has matured with the implementation of 
house commercialization and deepening reform in the land transferring system. Real estate prices 
rose from 2799 yuan to 8841 yuan from 1999 to 2013. However, China’s real estate market 
experienced a sustained downturn after the financial crisis of 2008. Consumers exhibited a 
wait-and-see attitude on housing purchases. In light of this, the government has taken a number of 
steps to modify policies and practices to regulate the housing market. Under the guidance of the 
central government, local governments published a series of policies to revive the flagging 
property market after 2008. For the local government, Xi’an government offered financial 
subsidies for the households whom bought houses during financial crisis, in accordance with 1.5% 
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of the total amount of purchase; Chengdu also provide subsidies to consumers. 
China’s economy has been severely affected since the financial crisis in 2008. Central 
government promulgated the monetary policy to stimulate the economic recovery. One of the most 
remarkable measures was that the government planned to invest four trillion yuan into the market, 
trying to stimulate domestic demand in a short period. Generally speaking, the policies’ main 
fields included infrastructure, social welfare, social security and social livelihood projects. By 
enlarging infrastructure, the activity of related industries should increase. Finally, industry 
spillover effects should spread into the real estate market. Since both the central government and 
local governments put money into big enterprises after the financial crisis, a lot of these 
enterprises bought land or houses for the sake of maintaining value and investment. Obviously, the 
behaviors of these enterprises would influence both the land and the housing market. 
It is noteworthy that the central government only provides 1.8 trillion yuan and the rest part 
were raised by local governments. Therefore, to finance the public finance, the local governments 
in china have to gain more income. In April 2001, local governments firstly identified themselves 
as the only providers of land. Under this kind of system, the local government controlled not only 
the supply of land, but also the land use structure and the availability of the land. To stabilize 
house prices and land prices and promote healthy development in the housing market, the Chinese 
government implemented market-oriented invitation to tender /auction /listing (IAL) measures in 
August, 2004. After this land transferring reform, the local governments had the right to sell land 
and grant land use rights. Land income gradually became the main source of fiscal revenue for 
local governments. 
As an important source of government revenue, increasing land income becomes an important 
mean to ease the financial pressure. Given this background, local governments tend to sell lands 
use rights at a higher price. In the public opinion, the so-called “land king” is a humorous way to 
call the real estate developers whom get their expected plots at a high price. Because of land 
ownership and land use rights are separated in China, real estate developers consider the land use 
rights as their capital and raise land price and house price to gain more benefits by hoarding land 
use rights. Government highly monopoly of land supply and land demanders’ competition markets 
are asymmetric. This kind of behavior breeds more “land king”, which followed by higher land 
price. 
As more and more land kings are generated, housing prices are also rising. From the 
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cost-driven perspective, land acquisition cost is an essential element of housing price. Land cost is 
considered to be the housing price’s main factor in the long run since the product price is 
determined by its cost. If the land price rises, the house price should also rise (Bostic et al. 2007). 
However, some studies consider that land price is driven by housing price since land is a 
derivative demand of housing service (Manning, 1988). The huge demand in the real estate market 
which drives the housing supply may not meet the housing demand. Excess demand pushes both 
housing price and land price up. 
Many scholars began to focus on the relationship of local government spending and property 
values. Charles (1956) proposed Tiebout model in his famous paper “A pure theory of local 
expenditure”. The paper have found that if consumers’ preferences and endowments were 
established, the general equilibrium of public goods which provided by local governments is 
optimal. With the improvement in Tiebout model, Oates (1969) have chosen 53 towns in New 
Jersey as samples, claimed that when the tax burden is fixed, public services and housing values 
are positively correlated. Rosenthal (1999) investigated the relationship among tax, local 
government spending and house prices, the results show that the local government spending has a 
significant effect on housing prices. 
Previous studies have analyzed the causal relationship between housing price and land price. 
Wu (2012) claims that there exists a bidirectional influence between land price and housing price, 
the progress of marketization in the granting of land use rights raises land price, thereby boost 
housing price. Haizhen Wen and Allen C.Goodman (2013) also show that housing price and land 
price have an endogenous interrelationship, housing price has a greater influence on land price. 
There is an opposing point of view. Peter Rossini and Valerie Kupke (2012) found that housing 
price is the granger cause of land price, but land price is not the granger cause of housing price. In 
China, the land purchase fee of each period reflects the government restrictions on land supply 
through the IAL measures. A number of studies have taken land supply control into consideration. 
For instance, Glaeser et al. (2005) (2006) found that artificial supply restriction is one of the main 
causes influencing increases in housing price. Both Zhu (2005) and Zhang (2013) insisted that 
land supply policy is the key cause for housing price changes. Wu et al. (2012) based on a sample 
of large Chinese cities, provided evidence that an increasing land value would make the housing 
price rise. Dowall and Landis (1982) considered density control and effective use of land can 
affect the house prices. Land price is seen as the cost of house prices. However, Glaeser and 
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Gyourko (2003) investigated that land price has no direct effect on housing price, the main cause 
of high prices is the government’s land use planning. 
There are few references concerning about the fiscal policy effect on the assets market. Many 
governments believe that fiscal stimulus is an effective factor for economic recovery. Many 
believe that the housing market might be influenced by fiscal measures, mainly via local 
government spending on subsidies and tax approach (Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2007). However, 
Antonio Afonso and Ricardo M. Sousa use the VAR counter-factual exercise and show that fiscal 
shocks play a minimal role in the assets markets in U.S. and Germany, while in the U.K., the 
government revenue shocks increase the variability of housing and stock prices. In an opposite 
view, if housing price goes up, boost residents’ concept of personal wealth, personal savings tend 
to reduce. In order to keep a balance, governments choose to increase their own savings and 
reduce spending. 
Based on the theories and literatures above, this study is novel in that it examines regional land 
market, house market and government literature to provide a new perspective regarding the causal 
relationship among house prices, land purchase fee and government spending after financial crisis 
by employing the bootstrap panel causality test. At the provincial level, housing price is 
determined to some extent by its own economic fundamentals and geographic position. In China, 
the economic development in coastal provinces is more advanced. Both the tremendous economic 
development potential and numerous sources of financial investment provide a solid foundation 
for coastal provinces’ real estate industry. Thus, it is meaningful to use coastal provinces as 
research objects. In addition, as capital of China, the development of real estate in Beijing should 
be considered as an example of rapid urbanization and increasing trend in housing investment to 
show the Chinese housing market’s characteristics. Therefore, we consider Beijing in our analysis 
as well. 
In this paper, firstly we examine whether a causal relationship exists among house price, land 
purchase fee, and government spending after the financial crisis of 2008. Secondly, by considering 
the effect of local government expenditure, we compare the results via normal causality approach 
and bootstrap panel causality test
10
, in order to confirm a causal relationship among the three 
                                                             
10
 Bootstrap panel causality is first proposed by Laszlo Konya (2006). Out of the hypothesis that there exits 
cross-sectional dependence among countries, we should not use OLS estimators to study the causality. 
Relationships between variables for each country individually, and SUR (seemingly unrelated regression) is more 
effective. Then, based on bootstrapping method (a re-sampling method), we obtain chi-square critical values by the 
Wald test. Through the critical values, we find the causality relationship between variables for each country. 
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variables in coastal provinces and cities in China. 
4.2 Data 
Our provincial-level data comes from the CEIC database and CEI.net, covering the period from 
2008Q1 to 2013Q3 for 10 provinces and cities (i.e., Beijing, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Hainan). The variables in this study include Logarithmic 
growth rate of housing price (GHP), logarithmic growth rate of land purchase fee (GLP) and 
logarithmic growth rate of local government spending (GGS). Housing price means the retail 
housing price for coastal provinces and cities, calculated by using retail housing purchase expense 
divided by retail housing purchase area. Land purchase fee represents the total amount of selling 
lands each quarter. Retail housing purchase expense and retail housing purchase area come from 
the CEI.net. We obtain GLP and GGS from the CEIC database. 
Table 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 summarize the data’s descriptive statistics. As you can see, the highest 
mean growth rate of housing price is found in Hainan and followed by Zhejiang, Shanghai and 
Fujian in the sample period. We find that the highest mean growth rate of land purchase expense is 
also found in Hainan, followed by Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian and Shandong. The growth rate of 
both house price and land purchase expense in Hainan is more volatile than in other areas. It 
appears that the highest mean growth rate of government expenditure goes to Hainan, which 
implies that the local government pays more attention to construction in the province. Fujian, 
Jiangsu and Shandong follow Hainan in terms of growth rate of government expenditure. 
4.3 Methodology 
We identify the causal relationships among 3 variables using the bootstrapping method. The 
crucial element in using this method is to confirm whether cross-sectional dependence among 
provinces exists. After the cross-sectional dependence test, we explain in detail, the bootstrap 
panel granger causality test. Then we briefly introduce the bootstrapping procedure. 
4.3.1 Cross-sectional dependency tests 
Within cross-sectional time-series data, prior to estimating bootstrap granger causality, we need to 
confirm whether there are contemporaneous effects in this system. The SUR (seemingly unrelated 
regression) estimators are more efficient than OLS estimators only if cross-sectional dependencies 
exist. If there is contemporaneous correlation across provinces, we need to employ SUR 
estimators in order to use the data effectively. OLS estimators are unable to include cross-sectional 
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dependencies in their results. 
To test cross-sectional dependency, we first use Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange Multiplier 
test. The B-P LM test helps us to decide if cross sectional dependency exists. Consider the normal 
panel data model as follows: 
         
                                                                              
where     is the explanatory vector,    is the individual intercepts and   
  is the parameters 
vector. 
The null and alternative hypotheses are: 
                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                   
If     is true, then we should not use SUR estimators. Briefly, B-P LM multiplier statistic is: 
         
  
     
   
                                                                         
where,    
  is the sample estimate of the residuals’ correlation from OLS estimation of panel data 
model. However, the B-P LM is valid for a long time series while   is quite small. To save this 
problem, Pasaran(2004) proposed the following alternative: 
    
  
      
      
 
 
     
   
   
                                                          
CD test is used under a wide range of panel data models. Despite the small sample bias of the 
parameter estimates, the residuals will have a mean of zero even when T is fixed. 
4.3.2 Bootstrapping panel causality 
Bootstrapping panel causality
11
 is used to test whether past values of variable     helps to 
improve the forecast of variable      , using data from N provinces during the period from 1 to   . 
   and     can be studied via the following bivariate VAR model for each province individually: 
                                            
    
   
    
                               
                                                                   
    
   
    
     
Where,   stands for the province           , t means the time period             ,   
refers to the lag,     and     represent the lag lengths.        and        are the white noises in 
this formulas system. From the above formulas, since the 2N equations’ parameters can be 
estimated one-by-one, we may write the formulas into two groups: 
                                                             
11
 Program codes are derived from the official website of rats software, which was written by Tom Doan. Source 
from: https://estima.com/procs_perl/grangerbootstrap.rpf 
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As Enders(2004) says, although there may be possible correlation links between error terms, 
each equation in the system can be estimated via OLS estimation. Yet, if the lag lengths are 
allowed to be different in each equation, then SUR (seemingly unrelated regressions) model is 
much more effective than the OLS model
12
. In these 2N equations, each of them contain different 
predetermined variables. A possible link is the contemporaneous correlation within the systems 
(i.e. cross-sectional dependency). Due to the link among these provinces (for instance, the 
economic relationships and external shocks which come from one province to another), this 
equation system should be estimated by SUR model. At the same time, the two variables    and 
   do not need to be stationary because we use bootstrap critical values. 
We can easily judge from the test of hypothesis-H0:    does not cause   , or    does not 
cause   . Our results can explain in the following situations: (i) In province  , if not all      are 0 
however all      are 0, there is one-way granger causality coming from     to   . (ii) If there is 
one-way granger causality from    to   , then all      are 0 but not all      are 0. (iii) There is 
two-way granger causality between     and   , when either all      or all      are not 0. (iv) If 
     and      are 0, then we consider that there is no granger causality between     and   . 
4.3.3 Procedure of bootstrap 
After estimation under the null hypothesis and there is no granger causality from X to Y, we obtain 
the residuals using SUR estimators. We then resample these residuals and randomly select 
bootstrap residuals from the column. After completing that, we generate a bootstrap sample of Y, 
assuming X is not the granger cause of Y. By substituting a new bootstrap Y for the previous Y, we 
                                                             
12
 As László Kónya(2005) pointed out that choosing lags is a crucial step since the causality test results will 
change according to lag structure. Too many lags waste observations and too few lags may cause bias in the 
regression coefficients. If we choose lags which are different in cross-districts, it would leads to a heavy 
computational burden. In order to avoid this problem, we do not permit different maximal lags from districts, but 
allow different maximal lags for X and Y. 
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estimate (4.6a) and calculate the Wald test statistic for each sample of province and city. Repeating 
this procedure 10,000 times, we build bootstrap critical values and finally test whether the 
bootstrap granger causality exists in each coastal province. 
4.4 Empirical results 
4.4.1 The results of panel granger causality approach 
In order to understand the bootstrap panel causality test better, we first examined the causality 
relationship among GHP, GLP and GGS by performing a normal granger causality approach. 
Table 4.5 to Table 4.7 exhibit the Wald-test results of this panel causality test. The findings show 
that there is one-way granger causality from GHP to GLP for Beijing, Jiangsu and Zhejiang. The 
null hypothesis in which GLP does not cause GHP was rejected in the case of Jiangsu and 
Guangdong at 1% level of significance. We find two-way granger causality of GHP and GGS in 
Guangdong, however, there is only one-way granger causality running from GHP to GGS in the 
case of Hebei and Hainan. These results imply that the granger causality exists from GGS to GHP 
for Jiangsu and Zhejiang. At a 10% or lower level of significance, we reject the null hypothesis 
that GLP does not cause GGS in 5 provinces: Shanghai, Jiangsu, Fujian, Shandong and Hainan. 
The findings support GGS as the granger cause of GLP in Hebei, Shanghai, Zhejiang and 
Shandong. 
4.4.2 The cross-sectional dependent test 
As previously mentioned, since all the provinces should have a high degree of integration in 
economic relations, panel causality estimation should pay more attention to the cross-sectional 
dependency test. Therefore, we test the cross-sectional dependency by B-P LM test and CDLM 
test. The results are illustrated in Table 4.4, it is obvious that the null hypothesis of no 
cross-sectional dependence is rejected at 1% level of significance. This suggests that a shock 
occurring in one province may be transmitted to another province. In the bootstrap panel causality 
test, SUR estimation is much efficient than the OLS method which estimates each province 
separately. Another important point to remember is that since we are using bootstrap values of the 
provinces, the variables x  and y  are not supposed to be stationary. 
If we ignore the cross-sectional dependency, and estimate the granger causality by the OLS 
method, province-by-province, it may lead to a misleading conclusion because there exits the 
nature of causality among the three variables of housing price, land purchase fee, and government 
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spending. According to the cross-sectional dependence test, we concluded that the coastal 
provinces and cities have strong connections within each other. Therefore, economic infiltration 
must be the reason for this cross-sectional dependence. 
4.4.3 The results of bootstrapping panel granger causality test 
Due to the existence of cross-sectional dependence, bootstrap panel causality is considered to be 
appropriate method of analysis. We report the results of bootstrap panel causality test in Table 4.8 
to Table 4.13. The findings imply one-way granger causality from the growth rate of housing price 
to the growth rate of land purchase fee for Beijing and Jiangsu. In Guangdong, there exists 
one-way granger causality from GLP to GHP. Except for Beijing, there are non-causality 
relationships running from GHP to GGS in Hebei, Liaoning and other coastal provinces. The 
results in Table 4.11 and Table 4.12 indicate that there is no causality running from either GGS to 
GHP or GLP to GGS. Regarding the direction of granger causality from GGS to GLP, the null 
hypothesis is rejected only in Shandong province at 5% level of significance. 
From the results of bootstrap panel granger causality test, the neutrality hypothesis among GHP, 
GLP and GGS may hold in most of the coastal provinces. To be specific, the neutrality between 
GHP and GGS in most coastal provinces indicates that GGS has little to contribute to GHP, which 
implies that after financial crisis, local public finance did not affect housing price. The market 
rescuing policy might not have been efficient for the coastal provinces. As non-tranferable assets, 
Real estate’s geographical location and environment is unchangeable, these characteristics 
determine some districts’ sustained high levels of fiscal expenditure, which contributes to the 
stimulation of the economy and affects the housing market by a spillover effect among industries. 
The effects of local government spending on housing prices are mainly through providing public 
products and offering investment to housing markets by the big enterprises, or maybe, the 
government adjusting the land and housing market through some unknown financial platform, the 
details of which remain unknown in the data. However, in our research, we found local 
government spending has no straight effect on housing prices. The reason may be due to the policy 
effect is delayed or the government spending has indirect response effects on real estate market. 
From the analysis above, we should not conclude that local government spending is unimportant. 
For instance, the growth in the construction industry might promote the prosperity of the real 
estate industry. As a pillar industry in China, the real estate industry is quite important and needs 
to be regulated and supported by government. 
53 
 
Mention of the neutrality of GLP and GGS in most coastal provinces, the results suggest that 
GGS does not stimulate GLP except Shandong province. After the land transformation, local 
government revenue relies on the land income. To a certain extent, land purchase fee can be seen 
as the cost of public service for local residents. As we mentioned above, even the government 
invested lots of money in the market, the land income is not affect by this investment policy in 
most coastal provinces. Shandong is the only province which rejected the null hypothesis. When 
GGS goes up, the government requires more income by selling lands. 
Guangdong is the only province which rejected the hypothesis that GLP does not cause GHP at 
10% level of significance. As we all know, selling land use rights is the crucial revenue for local 
government. Land suppliers buy land from the local government and treat it as the cost of house 
construction. Housing prices does reflect residents’ living cost in Guangdong province. However 
in other coastal provinces, the results imply that as the residential living cost, land income is no 
matter to do with housing prices, which suggests the public finance is not the reason for increasing 
housing price. 
Regarding the granger causality running from GLP to GGS, we noticed that there is no 
significant granger causality in any of these regions. However, the results show that GHP is not 
the granger cause of GGS except Beijing. As the capital of China, Beijing has a very mobile and 
growing population which brings residential demand to the city. After early economic 
development, Beijing government has more abundant revenue resources and capable to provide 
public services. Suitable environment and development expectation attract numerous talented 
person choose to settle down in Beijing. Because of the inflow of capital and technology, local 
economy has got a rapid development, which stimulating the growth of government spending. Or 
for another reason, the effect of GHP on GGS might reflect the government’s rent-seeking 
behavior intuitively. Rent-seeking means the government using its power in order to gain benefits, 
and spend the benefits on government welfare. 
The neutrality hypothesis of a relation between GHP and GLP holds in most coastal provinces. 
It is significant that we found one-way granger causality from GHP to GLP in Beijing and Jiangsu, 
which indicates when GHP goes up, GLP will change in Beijing and Jiangsu (from Table 8). In 
these two provinces, as housing prices rise, the land supplier may sell land use rights at a higher 
price and gain more land income. As we found in most of the coastal provinces and cities, GHP 
may not be affected by GLP. However, Guangdong province rejects the null hypothesis that GLP 
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causes GHP at 10% significance. As the main source of government revenue, Guangdong 
government’s land income can be seen as one of the house-building costs for housing suppliers. If 
the cost goes up, the commodities’ prices will also rise. 
From Table 4.5 to Table 4.7, the results show the granger causal relationship among GHP, GLP 
and GGS via normal granger causality approach. Through the comparison between these two 
different granger causal test results (Table 4.14), we easily notice that panel granger causality 
approach shows the null of no causal nexus between variables is rejected at the conventional level 
of significance in more provinces. However, in the provinces which rejected the null hypothesis in 
the normal panel causal test almost all include provinces which show causal relations between 
variables in bootstrap causality test. The most important differences between the two methods is 
show that: the results show no granger causality from GGS to GHP and GLP to GGS according to 
the bootstrap panel approach, while these two sets have nexus in several provinces through normal 
estimation. Since the bootstrap method allows cross-sectional dependence, it is possible to exploit 
more efficient information to make estimation. Furthermore, province specific critical values are 
generated, and the model may provide more believable information to get the outcomes. 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this paper we presented a new bootstrap panel causality test using data from 10 coastal 
provinces and cities over the period from 2008Q1 to 2013Q3, trying to investigate the possible 
granger causal linkages among the growth rate of housing price, the growth rate of land purchase 
fee and the growth of local government spending after a financial crisis. It is important to evaluate 
the government stimulating economic policies’ effect on housing market and land market. Another 
important point is that we try to compare the different test results between normal causality test 
and bootstrap panel causality test. 
As we discussed above, via panel granger causality approach, there is one-way granger 
causality from GHP to GLP in Beijing and Zhejiang, and from GLP to GHP in Jiangsu, 
Guangdong and Hainan. Our results also lend some support to causality running from GHP to 
GGS in Beijing, Guangdong, Hainan and from GGS to GHP in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Guangdong. 
There is two-way granger causality between GLP and GGS in Shanghai and Shandong. 
Apparently, our analysis does not accord with the opinion of Antonio Afonso and Ricardo 
M.Sousa (2011), Maclennan et al., 1999, they hold the opinion that the government spending 
shocks have a positive and persistent influence on housing price and various fiscal measures 
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influence the housing market. 
The bootstrap panel granger causality test results suggest that there is one-way granger causality 
from GHP to GLP in Beijing and Jiangsu. As regard to the direction of GLP to GHP in coastal 
provinces, a significant relationship exists in Guangdong. Beijing rejects the hypothesis that GHP 
does not cause GGS at 5% level of significance. We find one-way granger causality running from 
GGS to GLP in Shandong only. There is no empirical evidence of granger causality from GGS to 
GHP and from GLP to GGS in any coastal province or city, which indicates that the measure of 
putting four trillion yuan into the market by government to enlarge domestic demand when a 
financial crisis happens has no effect on housing market, at least in coastal areas. 
By comparing the two measures, it is clear that these two tests show different results. However, 
the outcomes which are shown in normal method generally contain the results from bootstrap 
panel causality tests. We need to emphasis that bootstrap panel causality test allows 
cross-sectional dependence and different lag lengths in the system. Therefore the formulas have 
effective information and may get more accurate results. 
From the above conclusion, the results show granger causality among three variables after 
financial crisis. Since there is no evidence of granger causality from GGS to GHP in any coastal 
provinces including Beijing and Shanghai via bootstrap approach, local government spending is 
not a direct cause stimulating housing prices. Therefore, the government need not to put liquidity 
into the market to revive the real estate industry. Among coastal provinces, the nexus among GHP, 
GLP and GGS are not the same with each other. Different local governments should adopt 
different policies to regulate the real estate market based on their own economic structure. 
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Table4.1 descriptive statistics of the growth rate of house price (GHP) 
 Mean Max. Min. Std.dev. Skew. Kurt. J.-B. 
Beijing 0.0822 0.5328 -0.2787 0.1839 0.6203 3.3478 1.5910 
Hebei 0.1039 0.3711 -0.1215 0.0985 0.2383 4.3348 1.9250 
Liaoning 0.0655 0.1604 -0.0446 0.0569 -0.1951 2.1690 0.8077 
Shanghai 0.1147 0.5963 -0.2268 0.2053 0.5247 2.7930 1.0960 
Jiangsu 0.0962 0.2993 -0.0350 0.0834 0.6699 2.7356 1.7870 
Zhejiang 0.1150 0.3352 -0.0591 0.0990 0.2456 2.5856 0.3950 
Fujian 0.1122 0.2977 -0.1773 0.1097 -0.6126 3.4956 1.6740 
Shandong 0.0942 0.2290 -0.0403 0.0731 0.2330 2.1782 0.8553 
Guangdong 0.0715 0.1758 -0.0497 0.0651 -0.1838 1.8002 1.5090 
Hainan 0.1163 0.4681 -0.2288 0.1766 0.2505 2.6473 0.3597 
Note: The sample period is from 2008Q1 to 2013Q3 
 
Table4.2 descriptive statistics of the growth rate of land purchase fee (GLP) 
 Mean Max. Min. Std.dev. Skew. Kurt. J.-B. 
Beijing 0.2043 1.5870 -0.6136 0.5923 0.9197 2.8830 3.2560 
Hebei 0.1141 0.6655 -0.4408 0.3146 -0.1581 1.9820 1.0890 
Liaoning 0.1776 0.7633 -0.5827 0.3250 -0.4472 2.8309 0.7939 
Shanghai 0.2343 1.0192 -0.6342 0.4498 0.0057 2.0024 0.9538 
Jiangsu 0.1467 0.9579 -0.8086 0.3825 -0.2640 3.3770 0.4034 
Zhejiang 0.2033 0.9099 -0.2571 0.2522 0.8552 4.2379 4.2720 
Fujian 0.0931 1.2574 -1.2320 0.6045 0.1320 2.9347 0.0709 
Shandong 0.2064 0.5526 -0.2326 0.2151 -0.2714 2.4626 0.5591 
Guangdong 0.1244 0.7997 -0.7354 0.4071 -0.4014 2.7585 0.6736 
Hainan 0.2806 1.8443 -0.8393 0.6076 0.4572 3.3399 0.9121 
Note: The sample period is from 2008Q1 to 2013Q3 
 
Table4.3 descriptive statistics of the growth rate of government expenditure (GGS) 
 Mean Max. Min. Std.dev. Skew. Kurt. J.-B. 
Beijing 0.1581 0.3478 -0.0635 0.1149 0.1060 2.0569 0.8954 
Hebei 0.1983 0.6858 -0.1084 0.1997 0.7252 3.1660 2.0420 
Liaoning 0.1885 0.2994 0.0878 0.0633 -0.0583 2.0335 0.9083 
Shanghai 0.1254 0.5426 -0.1848 0.1628 0.4561 3.4666 1.0060 
Jiangsu 0.1995 0.3221 -0.0107 0.0762 -1.0646 4.1679 5.6520 
Zhejiang 0.1606 0.2708 0.0110 0.0731 -0.3780 2.0898 1.3420 
Fujian 0.2010 0.3743 0.0130 0.0873 -0.2452 2.8315 0.2577 
Shandong 0.1901 0.3740 0.0330 0.0856 0.2447 2.6005 0.3825 
Guangdong 0.1651 0.3377 -0.1012 0.1106 -0.9311 3.4533 3.5200 
Hainan 0.2584 0.5514 0.0156 0.1574 0.4560 2.0210 1.7150 
Note: The sample period is from 2008Q1 to 2013Q3 
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Table 4.4 Cross-sectional dependence test 
Study Method Test.stat. p-value 
Breuch and Pagan (1980) CDBP 127.8990
***
 0.0000 
Pesaran (2004) CDLM 7.9920
***
 0.0000 
***
indicates significance at the 0.01 level. 
 
Table 4.5 Granger causality between GHP and GLP 
 H0 GHP does not cause GLP H0 GLP does not cause GHP 
province Test stat. p-value Test stat. p-value 
Beijing 26.3800
***
 0.0000 6.4510 0.1679 
Hebei 5.6490 0.2269 1.5900 0.8106 
Liaoning 2.2660 0.6870 2.2800 0.6844 
Shanghai 4.2030 0.3793 8.3180 0.0806 
Jiangsu 20.0750
***
 0.0005 13.3600
***
 0.0096 
Zhejiang 14.8800
**
 0.0050 3.5140 0.4758 
Fujian 12.9080 0.0117 5.1260 0.2747 
Shandong 9.2880 0.0543 2.7770 0.5958 
Guangdong 5.8780 0.2084 18.5390
***
 0.0010 
Hainan 5.2370 0.2639 9.1600
*
 0.0572 
Notes: All are Wald-statistics. GHP, GLP and GGS denote the growth rate of house price, the 
growth rate of land purchase expenditure and the growth rate of government spending respectively. 
*,**
and 
***
 indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of significance, 
respectively. 
 
 
Table 4.6 Granger causality between GHP and GGS 
 H0 GHP does not cause GGS H0 GGS does not cause GHP 
province Test stat. p-value Test stat. p-value 
Beijing 18.9010 0.7199 7.1140 0.1300 
Hebei 5.1200
***
 0.0008 6.5330 0.1627 
Liaoning 3.1620 0.2752 3.7600 0.4395 
Shanghai 8.3960 0.5310 7.7300 0.1020 
Jiangsu 3.7390 0.0781 9.2470
*
 0.0552 
Zhejiang 2.7900 0.4425 11.1240
**
 0.0252 
Fujian 5.0110 0.5935 4.2260 0.3763 
Shandong 8.0310 0.2861 1.5070 0.8254 
Guangdong 11.0700
*
 0.0905 9.7500
**
 0.0449 
Hainan 11.0780
**
 0.0258 6.0420 0.1961 
Notes: All are Wald-statistics. GHP, GLP and GGS denote the growth rate of house price, the 
growth rate of land purchase expenditure and the growth rate of government spending respectively. 
*,**
and 
***
 indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of significance, 
respectively. 
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Table 4.7 Granger causality between GLP and GGS 
 H0 GLP does not cause GGS H0 GGS does not cause GLP 
province Test stat. p-value Test stat. p-value 
Beijing 3.4070 0.4922 3.3690 0.4981 
Hebei 3.3020 0.5087 14.4670
*
 0.0059 
Liaoning 4.4450 0.3492 3.3960 0.4938 
Shanghai 7.8020
*
 0.0991 10.4770
**
 0.0331 
Jiangsu 13.5750
***
 0.0088 5.3460 0.2536 
Zhejiang 1.4970 0.8272 14.8860
***
 0.0049 
Fujian 8.8660
*
 0.0645 6.9800 0.1370 
Shandong 9.1100
*
 0.0584 21.1750
***
 0.0003 
Guangdong 8.4840
*
 0.0754 7.5880 0.1079 
Hainan 0.9720 0.9140 5.4520 0.2440 
Notes: All are Wald-statistics. GHP, GLP and GGS denote the growth rate of house price, the 
growth rate of land purchase expenditure and the growth rate of government spending respectively. 
*,**
and 
***
 indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of significance, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 4.8 H0: GHP does not cause GLP 
 Wald statistics Bootstrap critical value 
1% 5% 10% 
Beijing 7.5212
**
 9.6399 4.7282 3.2839 
Hebei 0.8656 9.0167 4.6831 3.3164 
Liaoning 0.8670 9.5573 4.6472 3.1944 
Shanghai 0.6189 8.4329 4.2017 2.9848 
Jiangsu 4.6914
**
 8.9022 4.5219 3.3179 
Zhejiang 2.9708 9.3648 4.4893 3.1013 
Fujian 2.4316 10.1662 5.2699 3.6110 
Shandong 1.5760 9.4157 4.6894 3.3126 
Guangdong 0.9064 8.7026 4.3367 3.0847 
Hainan 0.7933 7.2125 3.6578 2.5778 
Notes: GHP, GLP and GGS denote the growth rate of house price, the growth rate of land 
purchase expenditure and the growth rate of government spending respectively.
 *,**
and 
***
 indicate 
rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of significance, respectively. 
Bootstrap critical values are obtained from 10,000 replications. 
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Table 4.9 H0: GLP does not cause GHP 
 Wald statistics Bootstrap critical value 
1% 5% 10% 
Beijing 1.0107 10.8319 5.2981 3.7323 
Hebei 0.2182 7.8187 4.0640 2.8143 
Liaoning 0.3188 9.1493 4.4197 3.1539 
Shanghai 1.3733 9.3165 4.9271 3.4782 
Jiangsu 2.5503 11.7204 5.4794 3.8732 
Zhejiang 0.5078 8.7637 4.4871 3.1856 
Fujian 0.7742 9.0646 4.4440 3.0981 
Shandong 0.3935 7.7474 3.9559 2.8786 
Guangdong 4.1327
*
 9.5315 4.6600 3.3146 
Hainan 1.5488 8.7651 4.3566 3.0702 
Notes: GHP, GLP and GGS denote the growth rate of house price, the growth rate of land 
purchase expenditure and the growth rate of government spending respectively.
 *,**
and 
***
 indicate 
rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of significance, respectively. 
Bootstrap critical values are obtained from 10,000 replications. 
 
 
 
Table 4.10 H0: GHP does not cause GGS 
 Wald statistics Bootstrap critical value 
1% 5% 10% 
Beijing 4.2604
**
 8.1971 4.0915 2.9032 
Hebei 0.7732 8.3703 4.4391 3.1440 
Liaoning 0.4527 9.0996 4.6047 3.2387 
Shanghai 1.3892 8.7032 4.2949 3.0674 
Jiangsu 0.7361 8.5238 4.4038 3.1880 
Zhejiang 0.3955 10.1526 4.9184 3.4166 
Fujian 0.7545 9.6210 4.7582 4.7582 
Shandong 0.7545 9.1694 4.7506 3.2739 
Guangdong 1.9768 9.7744 4.8146 3.4457 
Hainan 1.9786 8.4259 4.2822 3.0351 
Notes: GHP, GLP and GGS denote the growth rate of house price, the growth rate of land 
purchase expenditure and the growth rate of government spending respectively.
 *,**
and 
***
 indicate 
rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of significance, respectively. 
Bootstrap critical values are obtained from 10,000 replications. 
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Table 4.11 H0: GGS does not cause GHP 
 Wald statistics Bootstrap critical value 
1% 5% 10% 
Beijing 1.1354 7.8110 4.0889 2.8260 
Hebei 1.0258 7.9299 4.2003 3.0161 
Liaoning 0.5470 8.8460 4.4862 3.1314 
Shanghai 1.2552 8.7978 4.3616 3.0999 
Jiangsu 1.5673 9.7869 4.7199 3.3367 
Zhejiang 1.9895 9.7402 5.1375 3.5699 
Fujian 0.6227 9.3512 4.5841 3.2307 
Shandong 0.6227 8.9779 4.5000 3.2202 
Guangdong 1.6765 11.1387 11.1387 3.9989 
Hainan 0.9359 9.9216 4.9629 3.5583 
Notes: GHP, GLP and GGS denote the growth rate of house price, the growth rate of land 
purchase expenditure and the growth rate of government spending respectively.
 *,**
and 
***
 indicate 
rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of significance, respectively. 
Bootstrap critical values are obtained from 10,000 replications. 
 
 
Table 4.12 H0: GLP does not cause GGS 
 Wald statistics Bootstrap critical value 
1% 5% 10% 
Beijing 0.4910 8.8904 4.2517 3.0192 
Hebei 0.4744 7.5105 3.8484 2.6891 
Liaoning 0.6589 8.1601 4.1433 2.9645 
Shanghai 1.2694 7.5191 3.7458 2.6611 
Jiangsu 2.6078 9.7171 4.9531 3.4850 
Zhejiang 0.2050 8.6919 4.6920 3.3866 
Fujian 1.4866 10.4301 5.1178 3.6404 
Shandong 0.3083 8.1161 4.2095 2.9777 
Guangdong 1.4072 8.8992 4.5262 3.2520 
Hainan 0.1312 8.0167 4.3135 3.0595 
Notes: GHP, GLP and GGS denote the growth rate of house price, the growth rate of land 
purchase expenditure and the growth rate of government spending respectively.
 *,**
and 
***
 indicate 
rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of significance, respectively. 
Bootstrap critical values are obtained from 10,000 replications. 
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Table 4.13 H0: GGS does not cause GLP 
 Wald statistics Bootstrap critical value 
1% 5% 10% 
Beijing 0.4850 8.1207 4.0421 2.9212 
Hebei 2.8534 8.5255 4.4199 3.2212 
Liaoning 0.7102 7.7743 3.6975 2.6759 
Shanghai 1.8394 8.5635 4.3665 3.1022 
Jiangsu 0.8124 7.1865 3.6261 2.6191 
Zhejiang 2.9727 10.0193 4.8289 3.2740 
Fujian 1.1098 9.5949 5.0744 3.5920 
Shandong 5.1110
**
 7.3397 3.9460 2.8121 
Guangdong 1.2272 8.8274 4.1911 2.9438 
Hainan 0.8308 8.6668 4.4817 3.1723 
Notes: GHP, GLP and GGS denote the growth rate of house price, the growth rate of land 
purchase expenditure and the growth rate of government spending respectively.
 *,**
and 
***
 indicate 
rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of significance, respectively. 
Bootstrap critical values are obtained from 10,000 replications. 
 
 
Table 4.14 Comparison between panel granger causality approach and bootstrap causality text 
 GHP-GLP GLP-GHP GHP-GGS GGS-GHP GLP-GGS GGS-GLP 
N B N B N B N B N B N B 
Beijing R R    R       
Hebei     R      R  
Liaoning             
Shanghai         R  R  
Jiangsu R R R    R  R    
Zhejiang R      R    R  
Fujian         R    
Shandong         R  R R 
Guangdon
g 
  R R R  R  R    
Hainan   R  R        
Note: N represents the panel granger causality approach, B denotes the bootstrap granger 
causality test, R means rejection of the null hypothesis. GHP, GLP and GGS denote the growth 
rate of house price, the growth rate of land purchase expenditure and the growth rate of 
government spending respectively. 
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Chapter 5 
5. Conclusions 
5.1 Summary of main results 
This thesis proposes some crucial questions about Chinese real estate markets. Two chapters make 
analysis from the credit point of view. One concerns about the importance of real estate 
investment to the economy in China. Credit constraints in different regimes lead to various 
impacts of real estate investment on economic growth. Another focuses on the heterogeneous 
effect of credit on housing prices between two different regions. Then according to the land 
transform regulation in China, we emphatically analyze the relationship of public finance and 
retail housing prices after the financial crisis in 2008. 
Since 1992, Chinese government treated the real estate industry as a key industry in China. The 
amount of real estate investment began a substantial increase. Construction industry does have a 
positive effect on macroeconomics (Ofori and Han, 2003). Management efficiency of large real 
estate enterprises is higher than the small and medium enterprises’ efficiency (Shi and Liu, 2008). 
Based on this background, this chapter attempts to investigate the impact of real estate investment 
on the economic growth in different credit constraint regimes. Promoting effect of real estate 
investment on economic growth is obviously various in different situations of credit regimes. 
When the credit constraint is not bigger than threshold value 0.024, an increase in real estate 
investment will make economic growth rise 1.2155. When a regional credit constraint level 
exceeds the threshold value, an increase in real estate investment will bring economic rise about 
1.3767. Under the premise that the healthy development of the economy is guaranteed, local 
governments should reduce the credit constraints appropriately and improve the efficiency of real 
estate investment. 
 Most former diversity studies believed there is a long-run relationship between property prices 
and bank lending. Real estate credit expansion will result in increase of asset price (Borio and 
Lowe, 2002). There exist large differences in the effects of monetary policy shocks across regions 
of the United States (Michael T. Owang et. al, 2005). This chapter concerns about different effects 
of credit on housing prices in coastal provinces and inland provinces respectively. Through the 
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analysis, we find that both the real estate development loan and the personal mortgage loan have 
strong effect on housing prices, which means control the amount of commercial credit can adjust 
the real estate prices. The adjustment of real estate development loan seems to be more efficient 
than the personal mortgage loan does in the coastal provinces. In the inland provinces, the credit 
has limited impact on real estate market. Commercial banks need to broaden the real estate 
enterprise financing channel and make the credit channel more efficient in inland provinces. 
 China’s real estate market experienced a sustained downturn after the financial crisis of 2008. 
Consumers exhibited a wait-and-see attitude on housing purchases. In light of this, the 
government has taken a number of steps to modify policies and practices to regulate the housing 
market. Under the guidance of central government, local governments published a series of 
policies to revive the flagging property market. Chapter 4 examines whether a causal relationship 
among house price, land purchase fee, and government spending exists after the financial crisis of 
2008. The bootstrapping panel granger causality test results suggest that there is one-way granger 
causality from GHP to GLP in Beijing and Jiangsu. As regard to the direction of GLP to GHP in 
coastal provinces, a significant relationship exists in Guangdong. Beijing rejects the hypothesis 
that GHP does not cause GGS at 5% level of significance. We find one-way granger causality 
running from GGS to GLP in Shandong only. There is no empirical evidence of granger causality 
from GGS to GHP and from GLP to GGS in any coastal province or city, which indicates that the 
measure of putting four trillion yuan into the market by government to enlarge domestic demand 
when a financial crisis happens has no effect on housing market, at least in coastal areas. 
Therefore, local government spending is not a direct cause in stimulating housing prices. 
5.2 Limitations and future work 
Shortage of real estate data for each province is a main obstacle in housing market’s research in 
China, especially for the land transaction data. For panel data, because the period of China’s real 
estate development is short, data is lack for many provinces. Regional real estate problems are 
interesting topics in China. China is facing an ageing population problem, especially in developed 
areas. Some areas have population flow as a supplement for home buyers, but population outflow 
and ageing problem are significant in some other regions. In future, I would like to do some 
research on the relationship of regional ageing problem and housing market. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A. Panel VAR method
13
 
We propose an assumption that underlying structure is the same for each cross-sectional unit in 
panel VAR procedure. In order to fix “individual heterogeneity” problem, we introduce fxed 
effects in the model. The usual method is the mean-differencing procedure which used to get rid 
of fixed effects. Since Arellano and Bover (1995) have pointed that this measure might cause 
biased coefficients, they proposed a new method “helmert procedure”. “Helmert procedure” is the 
forward mean differencing-method which removes only the forward mean in data, i.e. the mean of 
all the future observations for each province-year. They confirmed that this change can keep the 
orthogonality between transformed variables and regressors. 
                                                             
13 Source from: Love, Inessa, and Lea Zicchino. "Financial development and dynamic investment behavior: 
Evidence from panel VAR. 
